Adelson & Anor v Associated Newspapers Ltd.

Applications to add two corporate claimants, or to allow an existing claimant to recover losses suffered by them, were refused. A court considering whether it is equitable to disapply the libel limitation period must examine the reasons for delay, the parties’ prejudice, the apparent merits and the public policy requiring genuine libel claims to be pursued promptly. Tactical delay, unexplained inaction and wasted costs weigh strongly against relief. Separate companies remain separate legal entities: one company cannot recover libel damages for injury to another’s reputation or losses, and a corporate claimant must establish a trading reputation.

The claim arose from a publication on 28 May 2005. The existing claimants were Sheldon Adelson and Las Vegas Sands Corp. They sought to introduce Las Vegas Sands LLC and Las Vegas Sands (UK) Ltd as additional corporate claimants.

An earlier application under CPR 19.5 had been rejected by Tugendhat J and on appeal. The new applications sought either disapplication of the limitation period under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980, or re-amendment so that Las Vegas Sands Corp could recover losses allegedly suffered by the other companies.

1. Limitation application refused. Section 32A confers a flexible discretion, but the court must respect the policy underlying the shortened limitation period for defamation claims. Genuine claims must still be identified and pursued with vigour.
2. Delay is itself contrary to the public interest and is not assessed solely by asking whether the defendant can still present its defence. The court must examine the reasons for delay, the defendant’s wider prejudice, the claimant’s likely prejudice, the apparent merits, the conduct of both parties and the proportionate use of litigation resources. The approach in Steedman v BBC [2002] EMLR 318 and Grovit v Doctor [1997] 1 WLR 640 supported that conclusion.
3. Here, the claimants knew of the corporate-reputation problem from the defence in January 2006, yet did not pursue section 32A relief until after the limitation period and the earlier procedural applications. The defendant faced additional claims, compensation exposure and substantial costs. The proposed claims were also weak, particularly in the absence of evidence of damage to UK Ltd’s trading reputation. The limitation bar was therefore not a windfall, and it was not equitable to disapply it.
4. Re-amendment refused. Companies are separate legal entities. One company cannot recover losses incurred by another, and a claimant cannot recover for injury to another person’s reputation. A corporate claimant must generally show that it has a trading reputation. The proposed amendment was therefore based on a bad point under the law as it stood and, in any event, was sought too late.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): an earlier application under CPR 19.5 had been rejected by Tugendhat J and on appeal. The present applications to disapply limitation or re-amend the claim were refused.