Gronostajski v Government of Poland

Under section 8 of the Extradition Act 2003, an extradition hearing does not begin merely because the case is called on while the requested person is absent. The requested person must appear or be brought before the judge, unless the judge properly decides to proceed in his absence, and the judge must decide to begin the hearing. Where non-production causes the hearing to be postponed, reasonable cause for the resulting delay is assessed by reference to the circumstances confronting the court and its response, rather than solely by asking whether prison or escort authorities were at fault. A short delay is relevant but is not determinative.

The claimant was detained following a European arrest warrant issued by a Polish court. An extradition hearing was fixed for 1 October 2007, but the claimant was not produced because of an administrative error and unexplained failure by the escort service. The District Judge adjourned the matter to the following day and refused the claimant’s application for discharge under section 8 of the Extradition Act 2003, finding reasonable cause for the delay. The claimant sought habeas corpus, challenging that decision. The central issues were whether the extradition hearing had begun on 1 October and whether reasonable cause existed for the delay.

1. The application was dismissed. The court nevertheless expressed real doubt whether habeas corpus was the appropriate procedure. The challenge was directed in substance against the District Judge’s refusal to order discharge and appeared properly suited to judicial review against the Magistrates’ Court. The court declined to insist on that procedural point in the present case and did not endorse the procedure for the future.

2. The extradition hearing had not begun on 1 October. The mere calling on of the case, with counsel present but the requested person absent, was insufficient. The provision of an opening note did not alter that conclusion. In principle, a judge could begin the hearing in the requested person’s absence, but nothing indicated that the District Judge had done so or had adjourned a hearing already begun. The circumstances instead showed an adjournment to permit the discharge application and, if it failed, to begin the extradition hearing on the following day.

3. The District Judge was entitled to find reasonable cause for the delay under section 8. The relevant focus was the situation in which the court found itself because the claimant had not been produced, and the court’s reasonable decision to postpone the hearing until the next day. It was unnecessary to resolve whether the prison authorities or escort service had a reasonable excuse for the non-production.

4. The judge could consider the overall circumstances, including that the delay was one day, that efforts had been made to secure production on 1 October, and that production occurred at the next available opportunity. The shortness of the delay did not itself establish reasonable cause, but it was a relevant circumstance. Any possible reliance on an irrelevant consideration did not justify quashing the decision because the finding of reasonable cause was independently sustainable.

Both judges agreed that the application should be dismissed. Detailed assessment of legal aid costs was permitted.