Kozluk v Circuit Court Lublin

For an extradition hearing to have begun under section 8 of the Extradition Act 2003, something must be said or done in court to communicate that the hearing has begun. An uncommunicated intention to open the hearing is insufficient. Merely adjourning the proceedings does not begin the hearing, although an express statement that the hearing is opened may suffice even if followed immediately by an adjournment.

Where the requested person’s legal aid application has not been processed, that may constitute reasonable cause for delaying the beginning of the hearing. The court may therefore refuse discharge under section 8(7), despite the hearing not having begun by the originally fixed date.

The appellant was subject to a European arrest warrant issued by a Polish judicial authority. His extradition had been ordered at Westminster Magistrates’ Court. The extradition hearing was initially fixed for 22 July 2009, but the proceedings were adjourned because his application for legal aid had not been processed.

The hearing was formally opened on 12 or 13 August 2009. The appellant applied for discharge under section 8(7) of the Extradition Act 2003, arguing that the hearing had not begun by the fixed date and that there was no reasonable cause for the delay. The district judge rejected the application. The central issues were what constituted the beginning of an extradition hearing and whether the delay caused by the outstanding legal aid application was reasonable.

1. Beginning of the hearing. The court followed the reasoning in Gronostajski v Government of Poland [2007] EWHC 3314 (Admin). Something must be said or done to show that the extradition hearing has begun. Merely calling on the case or adjourning it, without more, is insufficient. The judge’s private intention to begin the hearing has no effect unless communicated to the parties.
2. In the present case, nothing said or done on 22 July 2009 demonstrated that the hearing had begun. The hearing therefore began only when it was formally opened on 13 August. It had not begun by the date fixed under section 8 of the Extradition Act 2003.
3. Reasonable cause for delay. The failure to process the appellant’s legal aid application was reasonable cause for delaying the substantive extradition hearing. This was particularly so in light of article 11(2) of the Framework Decision, which recognises the requested person’s right to legal assistance. Although the hearing should have been formally opened on 22 July before being adjourned, the omission was a matter of formality because the substantive hearing could not proceed without resolving legal representation.
4. The appeal was allowed on the first issue but dismissed on the second. Since reasonable cause for the delay had been shown, the appellant was not entitled to discharge under section 8(7). The appeal was therefore dismissed overall.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): The court dismissed the appeal against the district judge’s refusal to order discharge under section 8(7) of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: The district judge refused the appellant’s application for discharge. The decision is described in the judgment but no separate citation is stated.