CR v CR

Ancillary relief remains a discretionary statutory exercise under section 25. There is no presumption of equality, although equality remains an important cross-check. Post-separation accruals should be assessed broadly where they derive from the marital partnership and the asset-producing role established during the marriage. The concepts of needs, compensation and sharing inform fairness but do not create separate heads of claim. A clean break generally requires the parties to be separated financially, but a significant imbalance between capital resources and one party’s continuing surplus income may justify an additional capital award. Compensation for speculative career prospects or an unquantifiable share in future asset growth should not ordinarily be awarded.

The wife applied for ancillary relief following the parties’ lengthy marriage, separation in 2004 and the husband’s continuing high earnings from his senior position in an international group. The principal issues were whether post-separation acquisitions and increases in value should receive different treatment; whether the wife should share in future growth of the husband’s incentive-scheme shares; and whether she should receive compensation for lost earning capacity or the husband’s future income.

The court also considered the valuation of the husband’s shares, the likely incidence of Dutch gains tax, the parties’ resources and needs, and the admissibility and weight of late expert and internet evidence.

1. Statutory discretion and equality. The application was determined under section 25. The statutory factors remained the governing framework. There was no presumption of equality, but the provisional result should be tested against equality as a yardstick following White v White 2001 AC 596.
2. Post-separation accruals. The husband’s post-separation acquisitions, mortgage reduction and increases in the value of his shares were not ring-fenced. They arose from the financial continuum created by the parties’ marital roles, including the wife’s sustained domestic and family contribution. All the assets were therefore considered at the date of the hearing on the same basis.
3. Needs, compensation and sharing. The observations in Miller and McFarlane 2006 2 AC 618 assisted in identifying the elements informing fairness, but they did not create independent heads of claim. The statutory criteria continued to control, and double-counting had to be avoided.
4. Future asset growth and career compensation. The wife’s proposed share in future increases in the value of the husband’s shares was rejected. The future increase was unquantifiable, and continuing financial ties would be disproportionate and inconsistent with the clean-break objective. Her alleged lost career prospects were too speculative and were adequately addressed, in any event, by the equal division of resources.
5. Future income imbalance. The husband’s likely net income of approximately £1 million annually, substantially exceeding his reasonable needs, could not fairly be ignored. Although the wife’s capital share would meet her reasonable needs, the continuing income imbalance and her historic contribution justified an additional capital sum of £1 million. The overall fair outcome was assessed at approximately £9 million for the wife, comprising an equal share of the existing resources plus that additional sum.
6. The court’s provisional view was that the additional sum should be paid by lump-sum instalments over about three years, with liberty to apply on implementation and costs. A variable periodical-payment order was not preferred.