Huntingdon Life Sciences Group Plc & Anor v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC)

Restrictions on protest must be justified by good reason and framed consistently with the fundamental right to engage in lawful protest. An existing injunction is not the starting point for deciding whether restrictions should continue: the claimant must justify both the injunction and opposition to liberalising variations. Restrictions must remain proportionate to continuing risks, including harassment, intimidation, obstruction and public-order concerns. In representative proceedings under CPR 19.6, an order may bind represented persons, but enforcement against a non-party requires specific permission of the court. Such permission should not ordinarily be granted in advance, because the factual basis for enforcement must be assessed in the individual case.

The claim concerned final injunctive relief sought by companies conducting animal research and their managing director, suing representatively for employees, against SHAC, an unincorporated association campaigning for the closure of the companies. Earlier interim injunctions had regulated protest at the companies’ premises, near employees’ homes and in defined exclusion zones. By trial, the defendants accepted that substantial injunctive relief should continue, but the parties disputed the scope and variation of the existing restrictions.

The issues included the definition of persons bound by the order, permitted numbers and parking, delivery to protest areas, use of megaphones, protest processions, and the enforceability of the order against persons represented under CPR 19.6.

1. Final injunction. The court made a final order regulating protest at the Alconbury and Occold sites and near employees’ homes. The existing order was a practical template, but the legal starting point was the entitlement to lawful protest. HLS therefore had to justify the restrictions and any opposition to proposed liberalisation.
2. Scope and proportionality. The definition of “Protestors” properly included persons acting in concert with SHAC, since otherwise the order could be evaded by changing organisational allegiance. The restrictions were adjusted according to geography, history, safety and public-order evidence. At Alconbury, one megaphone was permitted at low or medium amplification between noon and 1 pm. A total ban was no longer justified, although unrestricted amplification could facilitate intimidation or materially affect employees. At Occold, the different geography and lack of pressure for relaxation did not justify an equivalent provision. Processions were permitted every three months, subject to stringent conditions.
3. CPR 19.6 enforcement. Under CPR 19.6(4), the final order was binding on persons represented by the second claimant, but it was not enforceable against an individual non-party without the court’s permission. The court rejected the proposed advance permission. The distinction between being bound and being enforceable protected represented persons against enforcement based on circumstances that could only be assessed later.
4. Damages. The proposed damages claim was abandoned. The judge indicated that representative proceedings were suitable for injunctive relief concerning future protest, but the represented persons’ interests in a tort claim for damages were too divergent to provide the common interest required by CPR 19.6.

The judgment records earlier interim orders made by Pitchers J. on 16 April 2003, continued by Gibbs J. on 20 June 2003, and replaced or continued by Mackay J. on 28 May 2004. This court determined the claim at trial and made a final order.