Bayer Cropscience Ltd & Anor v Stop Huntingdon Cruelty ("SHAC") & Ors

[2009] EWHC 3289 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2009] EWHC 3289 (QB)
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
22 December 2009
Judgment text

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Subjects
Tort Human rights Protection from harassment injunctions
Keywords
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 final injunction harassment proportionality freedom of expression freedom of assembly exclusion zones protest restrictions megaphones former employees
Outcome
final injunction granted and settled as directed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Final harassment injunctions must protect claimants while permitting defendants to act lawfully. The court must balance the competing rights under Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and act proportionately. The order may extend to persons acting in concert who have notice of its terms, and to persons reasonably believed to have harassed or threatened protected persons, provided they receive specific notice and can apply to vary or discharge the order. The appropriate restrictions depend on the evidence and circumstances. There is no standard form of injunction. Restrictions on protest location, duration, timing and amplified sound may be justified where necessary to prevent harassment and intimidation.

Factual background

The claimants sought final injunctions following summary judgment on liability against SHAC and individual defendants involved in a sustained campaign of harassment and criminal and tortious activity. The injunctions were to replace interim orders and regulate protests directed at the claimants, their employees and associated protected persons.

The court determined the proper scope and duration of the injunctions, the definitions of “Protestors” and “Protected Persons”, exclusion zones, designated protest areas, protest duration and timing, use of megaphones, and the procedure for variation or discharge.

Held

  1. Proportionality. The final injunctions had to preserve the claimants’ rights while permitting the defendants, within reason, to act lawfully. Articles 8, 10 and 11 were to be read together. The defendants’ rights of expression and assembly had to be balanced against the claimants’ and employees’ rights not to be harassed and not to be compelled to hear unwanted communications.
  2. Persons bound by the order. “Protestors” properly included the named defendants, persons acting in concert with them to carry out prohibited unlawful acts who had notice of the order, and persons whom the claimants reasonably believed had harassed or threatened to harass protected persons. The latter category required specific notice of all the order’s terms. Such persons could apply to vary or discharge the order, including on the ground that the claimants lacked reasonable belief.
  3. Protected persons and duration. The definition of protected persons could include former employees, given the evidence that persons associated with the claimants had been targeted. An indefinite order was preferable to a mandatory five-year review because any party could apply at any time for variation or discharge.
  4. Protest restrictions. Weekly protests in designated areas, limited numbers and durations, and a restriction to daytime hours were proportionate in the circumstances. The defendants could protest elsewhere, subject to the law and the injunction. The use of amplified sound was capable of intimidating employees and compelling them to listen. One megaphone could therefore be used at a time for no more than two periods of 15 minutes, separated by at least one hour and limited to medium amplification.
  5. A further unrestricted procession or assembly within the exclusion zones was unnecessary and excessively broad. The order had to be based on the evidence and argument in this case; earlier orders could inform the court but did not provide a standard form.
  6. The final order was to be drawn up consistently with the judgment. It was to include a 14-day notice period for applications to vary or discharge, while preserving the possibility of emergency relief without notice or on shorter notice.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

The judgment followed summary judgment on liability made by Mr Justice Hamblen on 23 July 2009. It concerned the scope of the final injunctions replacing interim injunctions previously made by Mr Justice Treacy.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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