Aweys & Ors, R (on the application of) v Birmingham City Council

A person who is homeless at home under section 175(3) of the Housing Act 1996 cannot lawfully be required to remain in that accommodation, even temporarily. If a council intends to discharge its section 193 duty through settled accommodation, it must provide suitable interim accommodation where necessary.

A homelessness application must be investigated under section 184 whenever the authority has reason to believe that the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness. A prevention scheme cannot defer that duty. An allocation scheme may assist in discharging the homelessness duty, but cannot replace it. A policy which gives materially lower priority to homeless-at-home applicants in unsuitable accommodation than to roofless applicants in suitable temporary accommodation is unlawful.

Seven claimants challenged Birmingham City Council’s handling of their homelessness applications. Each had a large family and occupied accommodation which the Council accepted was unsuitable, or had accepted that the full duty under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 was owed. The Council generally placed them in Band B under its Part VI allocation policy, while reserving Band A for applicants in Council-arranged temporary accommodation.

The claims concerned delay in accepting applications, the use of the Home Options scheme, failure to provide suitable accommodation, the legality and application of the allocation policy, and possible claims under Article 8 of the Convention.

1. Claims succeeded. The Council had failed to comply with its duties under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996.
2. The section 184 duty is triggered by information giving the authority reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness. No particular form of application is required. The authority cannot defer its inquiries to avoid, or postpone, a statutory duty.
3. Where homelessness arises under section 175(3), the existing accommodation cannot be suitable. The applicant is homeless because it is not reasonable to expect continued occupation. This remains so even if the accommodation might otherwise be tolerable for a short period.
4. A council may seek to prevent homelessness and may use Part VI accommodation to discharge the section 193 duty. Those functions must operate in parallel with the Part VII duties. The Home Options scheme could not lawfully be used to postpone consideration of a homelessness application.
5. Including an applicant on the housing register does not discharge the section 193 duty. If the Council’s policy was to provide settled accommodation, it still had to provide suitable temporary accommodation where a delay was likely. The distinction between Band A and Band B was unlawful for applicants owed the full homelessness duty, because homeless-at-home applicants were left in unsuitable accommodation while roofless applicants could receive higher priority.
6. The court should consider the nature and extent of the unsuitability, the length of the breach, the Council’s efforts, and the likelihood of suitable accommodation becoming available. Families may prefer to remain temporarily, but remaining must be by agreement, and any period must be short and clearly justified. Six weeks, the maximum ordinarily applicable to bed-and-breakfast accommodation, was a guide rather than a rigid universal limit.
7. The Article 8 claims were not struck out. Article 8 does not generally impose a duty to provide a home, but exceptional circumstances may arise where failures to provide suitable accommodation interfere with private or family life. Whether that threshold was met required assessment of the evidence.