Blackburn-Smith v Lambeth London Borough Council

A finding that children are in need does not, by itself, impose an absolute duty under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 to provide accommodation and subsistence to them or their parent. Section 20 may impose a specific accommodation duty, but that duty does not necessarily require accommodation of parent and children together. A local authority may lawfully offer return to the country of origin instead of continuing support where it has made sufficient inquiries and is confident that the children will cease to be in need. It must consider the children’s welfare, family-life rights under Article 8, available family or other support, finite resources and immigration-control considerations. Whether accommodation or separation is required remains fact-sensitive. Judicial review does not permit the court to substitute its own assessment for that of the authority.

The claimant, who had no leave to remain in the United Kingdom, sought judicial review of Lambeth’s decision to withdraw accommodation and financial support provided to her and her children under the Children Act 1989. The children were British citizens and were accepted to be in need when the support ended. Lambeth offered accommodation for the children under section 20, which the claimant declined, and offered to fund the claimant’s return to Jamaica with them. The claimant argued that section 17 required accommodation for the family together, that fresh assessments were necessary, and that withdrawal breached Article 8. The central issues were the scope of the authority’s statutory duties, the adequacy of its assessments, and whether its decision was unlawful, perverse or irrational.

1. Application dismissed. The decision to withdraw support was not unlawful, perverse or irrational.
2. Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 imposes no absolute duty to accommodate children in need or their parent. The analysis in R (G) v Barnet LBC [2004] 2 AC 208 confirmed that the provision confers powers and duties of a general and target character, rather than requiring particular services in every case.
3. Section 20 imposed a duty in the circumstances identified by the statute. Lambeth discharged that duty by offering accommodation for the children. The claimant’s refusal of that offer did not convert the section 17 power to provide accommodation for the family into an absolute duty.
4. No fresh assessment was required on 18 May 2006. The earlier assessments had contemplated that the children might become in need, considered available options, and were capable of being varied as circumstances changed. They were living documents and the authority had undertaken further consideration.
5. Before discharging its Children Act responsibilities by offering return to Jamaica, the authority had to be confident that the children would cease to be in need and had to consider Convention rights. The guidance in R (M) v Islington LBC [2005] 1 W.L.R. 884 was applied in the light of the facts. Lambeth had made sufficient inquiries and was entitled to conclude that accommodation with family, benefits, employment or a combination of those resources would meet the children’s needs.
6. The authority had considered the Article 8 rights of the claimant, the children and their father. Article 8 did not confer a right to reside in a particular country or an absolute right that all family members live together. The proposed return to Jamaica would not breach those rights on the evidence before the court.
7. The authority was entitled to consider finite resources, the competing needs of others, the claimant’s immigration status and Parliament’s exclusion of persons in that position from mainstream benefits. Any wider question concerning care proceedings would fall to another court.

First-instance judicial review application determined by the High Court (Administrative Court). No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.