R+V Versicherung Ag v Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Solutions SA & Ors

The slip rule cannot correct an error of substance or be used to alter a final judgment on the merits. Under CPR 3.1(7), the power to vary or revoke an order cannot ordinarily be used by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction as an equivalent to an appeal. Reconsideration may be available in exceptional circumstances, such as a material change of circumstances or where the earlier judge was materially misled. A party seeking to challenge the correctness of a final merits judgment must ordinarily appeal to the Court of Appeal.

R+V Versicherung AG obtained judgment against four companies in the Risk group following findings that they participated in a conspiracy involving insurance binders and unauthorised commission deductions. The second and third defendants applied under CPR 3.1(7) and the slip rule, CPR 40.12, to set aside or vary the orders made by Moore-Bick J. They argued that no proper case or findings had been made against them and that they were not parties to the binders.

The application came before Gloster J in the Commercial Court after permission to appeal had been refused on earlier applications, with a renewed application apparently pending. The central issue was whether a first-instance judge could revisit another High Court judge’s final merits judgment under the procedural rules.

1. Application dismissed. The orders against the second and third defendants reflected Moore-Bick J’s findings that they were parties to the conspiracy. The defendants had also agreed the form of the orders at the time.
2. CPR 40.12 is confined to correcting an accidental slip or omission, such as a typographical error or a genuine clerical mistake. It cannot be used to correct an error of substance or to add to or detract from the original order. The proposed changes challenged the substance of the judgment and therefore fell outside the rule.
3. CPR 3.1(7), although not limited in terms to procedural orders, could not in this context be used to revisit a final judgment on the substantive merits. The court adopted the approach in Lloyds Investment (Scandinavia) Ltd v Christen Ager-Hanssen [2003] EWHC 1740 (Ch): reconsideration may be possible where there has been a material change of circumstances or the earlier judge was materially misled, but not where the applicant merely seeks to re-argue the case on material available at the original hearing.
4. The Court of Appeal’s approach in Collier v Williams [2006] EWCA (Civ) 20 confirmed that CPR 3.1(7) cannot operate as an equivalent to an appeal. A judge exercising parallel jurisdiction in the same division could not entertain what was effectively an appeal from Moore-Bick J’s judgment and orders.
5. Even if jurisdiction existed, the discretion would not have been exercised. The alleged liability under the binders could potentially be supported by the defendants’ conspiracy liability and the misappropriation or withholding of sums, but those substantive issues were matters for an appeal, not for determination under CPR 3.1(7).

The judgment records that permission to appeal against Moore-Bick J’s judgment had been refused on earlier applications, although a renewed oral application was pending. This application was dismissed by Gloster J. Any challenge to the substantive judgment or orders had to be pursued in the Court of Appeal.