Parris v Williams

A common intention constructive trust may arise without a written declaration where parties agree or understand that land is to be shared beneficially and the claimant acts to their detriment, or significantly alters position, in reliance. Under the Law of Property Act 1925, the claimant need not prove a bargain or perform an act expressly required by the agreement. The conduct must amount to acting upon the common intention. Whether the detriment is sufficiently substantial is judged in all the circumstances. Contributions may be materially less than the legal owner’s, but they must not be trivial. An appellate court should not disturb the trial judge’s factual or evaluative findings without a proper basis.

Albert Williams claimed a beneficial interest in one of two adjoining flats bought in Julian Parris’s name. The parties had informally agreed or understood that each would ultimately have one flat. Williams could not contribute to the purchase financially, but the Recorder found that he contributed labour, maintenance payments and other sums in reliance on the arrangement.

The Bournemouth County Court declared that Parris held Flat 6 on trust for Williams absolutely and ordered its sale. On appeal, Parris argued that Williams had to prove that the agreement required him to make the contributions relied upon, and that the contributions were insufficiently substantial. The central issue was whether a bargain or prescribed performance was necessary in an express common-intention constructive trust case.

1. The appeal was dismissed. Rimer LJ gave the judgment, and Moore-Bick LJ agreed. The Recorder’s declaration that Flat 6 was held on trust for Williams was therefore maintained.
2. The absence of writing defeated a bare oral promise to confer a beneficial interest in land, but did not prevent a common intention constructive trust under sections 53(1) and 53(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Once an express agreement, arrangement or understanding to share beneficially was established, the claimant had to show detrimental reliance or a significant alteration of position in reliance on it.
3. The court rejected the appellant’s bargain theory. The claimant did not have to prove that the agreement specified what he was to do, or that he had performed his part of such a bargain. The approach in Grant v. Edwards [1986] Ch 638 and Eves v. Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338 supported this conclusion. The narrower reading potentially derived from Gissing v. Gissing [1971] AC 886 and Midland Bank Plc v. Dobson [1986] 1 FLR 171 was rejected. The guidance in Lloyds Bank Plc v. Rosset and Another [1991] 1 AC 107, although strictly obiter in that case, placed the principle beyond doubt.
4. Whether reliance was sufficiently substantial was a matter of judgment for the trial judge, considering all the circumstances. Rosset showed that contributions could be too trifling, but equality with the legal owner’s contribution was unnecessary. The Recorder was entitled to find that approximately two days’ painting, payments towards maintenance and other expenditure, totalling more than £2,000, amounted to sufficient detriment despite Parris’s materially greater contribution.
5. The Court of Appeal found no basis for reopening the Recorder’s findings of fact or his assessment of detriment. The order for sale of Flat 6, payment of the net proceeds to Williams after specified deductions, and the costs order consequently stood.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In Parris v Williams [2008] EWCA Civ 1147 , permission to appeal was granted on the renewed ground and the appeal was dismissed.
• Bournemouth County Court: On 7 November 2007, Mr Recorder Stewart Patterson declared that Parris held Flat 6 on trust for Williams absolutely, ordered its sale and directed payment of the net proceeds to Williams after the specified deductions.