Reynolds, R (on the application of) v Independent Police Complaints Commission & Anor

The Independent Police Complaints Commission’s statutory remit in a death or serious injury matter extends to determining whether police conduct caused or contributed to the injury. That requires it to evaluate and test evidence of a competing cause, even where the event occurred before police contact. It need not conduct a criminal investigation into possible third-party offending; that remains for the police. Where serious injury occurs in custody and state agents may be responsible, Articles 2 and 3 require an independent inquiry. The causation inquiry is single and composite, so its independence is not lost merely because it overlaps with a police investigation. The Commission retains discretion over the method, subject to the requirement of independence. The appeal was dismissed.

Mr Graeme Reynolds sought judicial review after his brother, Garry Reynolds, suffered severe brain injury following arrest and detention by Sussex police. The IPCC investigated events after police contact but initially declined to investigate possible causes before contact. Collins J held that the IPCC had power to consider pre-contact events and that an investigation was required by Articles 2 and/or 3, making declarations in CO23772008. The IPCC appealed, arguing that pre-contact events were matters for the police, that Convention independence was unnecessary where a third party might be responsible, and that local police assistance could satisfy independence. The central issue was whether the IPCC had power and duty to conduct an independent causation inquiry extending to possible pre-contact causes.

1. Appeal dismissed. The declarations made by Collins J were left unchanged.
2. Under section 10 of the Police Reform Act 2002 and paragraph 14D of Schedule 3, the IPCC had both power and duty to investigate the relevant serious injury matter and complaint. Determining whether police conduct caused or contributed to the injury necessarily required evaluation and testing of evidence suggesting a competing cause before police contact. A merely passive consideration of that evidence was insufficient.
3. This did not require the IPCC to conduct a criminal investigation into potentially criminal conduct by third parties. That remained a matter for the police. The IPCC nevertheless had to make its own evaluative causation assessment, including the evidential significance of any third-party cause.
4. Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights require a proper and effective investigation where the relevant Convention rights are engaged. An inquiry into serious injury occurring in custody must be independent where the police may have been responsible. The causation inquiry was single and composite, so independence could not be divided between police contact and possible earlier events. Overlap with a police investigation did not remove the IPCC’s duty to investigate independently. The court relied on the independence principles reflected in Jordan v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 52 and Amin v United Kingdom [2004] AC 653.
5. The court endorsed the importance of family or next-of-kin involvement, keeping them informed and allowing representations. The IPCC retained discretion as to the method of investigation, subject to independence. The lower court’s observations about using the local police force’s Professional Standards Department were obiter and should not be treated as authoritative. The court declined to give further guidance in the absence of any specific proposal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2008] EWCA Civ 1160, the IPCC’s appeal was dismissed and the declarations were left unchanged.
• Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division — Collins J, on 16 May 2008 in CO23772008, declared that the IPCC had power to investigate possible pre-contact causes of the serious injury and that such an investigation was required by Articles 2 and/or 3.