Watson v Durham University

An injunction cannot be granted merely because it appears just to do so; it must support an underlying cause of action. In an employment case, an employer’s contractual power to suspend must be exercised on reasonable grounds. Suspension without reasonable and proper cause may breach the implied term of trust and confidence. Where unlawful suspension cannot be fully remedied by damages, an injunction may be appropriate. The court should examine the real contractual claim despite an incompetent presentation of the application. At the interlocutory stage, the relevant questions are whether there is a real prospect of success, whether damages are adequate, and where the balance of convenience lies.

Professor Robert Watson, a professor at Durham University Business School, was suspended on 17 December 2007 pending investigation of allegations including intimidation, harassment, racist behaviour and unfounded allegations concerning university staff. He sought an injunction restraining the suspension and disclosure of documents.

The Newcastle upon Tyne County Court, presided over by His Honour Judge Walton sitting as a deputy High Court judge, refused relief on 30 January 2008, holding that the claim as presented disclosed no jurisdiction to grant a freestanding injunction. Permission to appeal was adjourned by Jacob LJ, with the appeal to follow if permission were granted. The central issue was whether the suspension was arguably a breach of the employment contract and whether injunctive relief should be granted.

1. Appeal allowed. Permission to appeal was granted and an injunction restraining the suspension was granted on Professor Watson’s undertaking not to attend the university until the disciplinary proceedings ended.
2. An injunction requires an underlying cause of action and cannot be granted merely because it is just to do so, as illustrated by Siskina v Distos Cia Naviera [1979] AC 210. The judge should nevertheless have determined the application on the contractual basis apparent from the evidence, despite the incompetent presentation of the claim.
3. Paragraph 14(d) of the University’s Statutes formed part of the employment contract and gave the Vice-Chancellor power, if he saw fit, to suspend a member on full pay pending a final decision after referral of a complaint to a formal hearing. That power had to be exercised on reasonable grounds. Suspension without reasonable and proper cause could breach the implied term of trust and confidence, applying McClory v the Post Office [1993] 1 All ER 457 and Gogay v Hertfordshire County Council [2000] IRLR 703.
4. There was a real prospect of success on the breach of contract claim. Relevant matters included the delay in acting on the racism and intimidation allegations, the university’s earlier investigation of the PhD issue despite later presenting it as recent, the weakness of some allegations, and the extreme reaction to Professor Watson’s email.
5. Damages were plainly inadequate because the effects of unlawful suspension might not be fully healed in damages. An injunction was therefore an appropriate remedy, consistently with Mezey and South West London and St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 3473 (QB). The balance of convenience favoured relief, particularly because the undertaking removed the concern about interference with witnesses or disruption at the university.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission granted and appeal allowed. An injunction was granted on the appellant’s undertaking.
• Newcastle upon Tyne County Court: On 30 January 2008, His Honour Judge Walton, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, refused the injunction because the claim as presented was treated as seeking a freestanding injunction without an underlying cause of action.