Octagon Overseas Ltd & Anor v Coates

An injunction is generally ancillary to an underlying cause of action. The power to grant injunctions may develop in exceptional categories where necessary to avoid injustice, but that flexibility does not make injunctions generally freestanding. Enforcement of a First-tier Tribunal management order must follow the statutory and procedural routes provided for that purpose. The County Court may permit enforcement, but it cannot use an injunction to create new rights, vary the tribunal’s order or extend the manager’s functions. The tribunal itself may give further directions and, where necessary, attach a penal notice. Any injunction must be sufficiently precise and must identify the obligations allegedly breached.

The First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) appointed the respondent as manager of a residential estate under section 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. The respondent applied to the County Court for injunctions requiring the appellants to provide access, keys and documents and restraining interference with the manager’s functions. The injunctions were granted by HHJ Madge on 4 and 7 October 2016 with penal notices attached.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: the injunction against the freehold owner was wrongly made; the County Court lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction without an underlying cause of action; and the orders were too wide or insufficiently precise.

1. Appeal allowed on all three grounds. The injunction against Octagon Overseas Ltd was discharged because it had no relevant management functions and the point was conceded.
2. The County Court had power to assist with enforcement of the tribunal’s order, but the respondent’s claim was framed as an injunction application and no underlying cause of action existed. Siskina v Distos Conpania Neviera SA [1979] AC 210, Watson v Durham University [2008] EWCA Civ 1266 and Marketmaker Beijing Co Ltd & Ors v CMC Group Plc & Ors [2004] EWHC 2208 remained applicable. Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting [2016] EWCA Civ 658 recognised that injunctions may develop in new categories, but did not eliminate the ordinary requirement for an underlying cause of action.
3. Under section 176C of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 and CPR 70, the respondent could apply to the County Court for permission to enforce the management order in the same way as a County Court order. The procedural defect in not using form N322B could have been remedied under CPR 3.10. That route did not authorise an injunction with a penal notice which extended the tribunal’s order.
4. The tribunal had broad power under section 24(4) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 to give incidental or ancillary directions. It could, if necessary, attach a penal notice to its own management order. The respondent should have applied to the tribunal for directions or variation. The County Court could not vary the order or determine the extent of the manager’s appointment.
5. Even if an injunction had been available, the orders were defective. A prohibition on changing any locks or removing any property was too wide. The restraint on interfering with the manager’s functions was too vague because it did not identify the alleged failures to comply with the management order.

• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): appointed the respondent as manager for three years from 1 October 2016 and refused permission to appeal.
• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): refused permission to appeal.
• High Court (Chancery Division): allowed the appeal and discharged the injunctions granted on 4 and 7 October 2016.