Admiral Taverns (Cygnet Ltd) v Tracy Daly & Anor

Housing Act 1980, section 89, restricts the time for giving up possession where a possession order is made, including in cases involving trespassers and ended assured shorthold tenancies. The reference to “a court” covers any court making the possession order, including the High Court and county court. It does not remove an appellate court’s inherent jurisdiction to stay execution pending appeal. That jurisdiction is distinct from the jurisdiction of the court granting the original order and would require clear statutory words to displace it. An appellate court should consider the purpose of section 89 when deciding whether to grant a stay, and possession appeals within its scope should generally be expedited.

Admiral Taverns was head lessee of the Castle Tavern and entered into a caretaking agreement with Tracy Daly. After the underlying subtenancy had expired, the appellant sought vacant possession so that the property could be assigned. Craig Daniel refused possession and asserted that he had been granted a lease.

The County Court made an immediate possession order in the defendants’ absence. A stay was later granted by Teare J pending the determination of permission to appeal and then reinstated until the appeal was determined. The appellant challenged that order in the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether section 89 of the Housing Act 1980 prevented an appellate court from staying execution of a possession order pending appeal.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld Teare J’s reinstatement of the stay pending determination of the appeal.
2. Section 89(1) of the Housing Act 1980 applies to “a court” in its ordinary sense. It therefore restricts the court making a possession order from postponing possession beyond 14 days, or six weeks where exceptional hardship would otherwise result. The provision applies to possession cases involving squatters and ended assured shorthold tenancies because those matters are not among the statutory exceptions.
3. The statutory restriction does not displace the inherent jurisdiction of an appellate court to stay execution pending appeal. That jurisdiction is supported by Selwyn Bibby v Sumintra Partap and applies to possession orders. Section 89 would require very clear words to remove it. The subsection is properly read as principally restricting the jurisdiction of the court granting the order, rather than the appellate court exercising its inherent appellate jurisdiction.
4. An appellate court must nevertheless have regard to the purpose of section 89 when considering a stay. The court should avoid encouraging self-help and should determine possession applications and related appeals speedily. Whether the first-instance court itself may stay its order pending appeal was expressly left open.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2008] EWCA Civ 1501. Appeal dismissed; the stay pending appeal was upheld.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Teare J: granted and then reinstated a stay of execution pending determination of the appeal.
• County Court, HHJ Gibson: made an order for possession forthwith in the defendants’ absence and declined to vary it when Craig Daniel later attended.