Legal Services Commission v Rasool

For a statutory claim, limitation begins when the cause of action accrues, as determined by construction of the enactment. Under regulation 86(1) of the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, revocation of a legal aid certificate gives the Board a right to recover costs paid or payable under regulation 84(b). Taxation or assessment quantifies the recoverable amount but is procedural, not a condition precedent to the cause of action. Time therefore runs from revocation, even where the costs have not yet been taxed or assessed. This construction prevents delay and gives the formerly assisted person certainty about the limitation period.

The respondent received a legal aid certificate in 1993. It was revoked in 1999 for failure to provide requested information and documents. The costs were taxed in 2001 and paid by the Legal Aid Board in 2002. The Legal Services Commission, as successor to the Board, issued its claim in 2006 to recover those costs.

Deputy Judge Taylor dismissed the claim in the Halifax County Court, holding that the cause of action accrued on revocation and was therefore statute-barred. The appeal concerned whether, under section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980, time began to run on revocation or only when the costs were taxed or assessed.

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal. Ward LJ gave the judgment, and Smith LJ and Wilson LJ agreed.

1. Section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980 imposes a six-year period from the date on which the statutory cause of action accrued. The accrual date depends on the proper construction of the enactment creating the right to recover.
2. The legal aid scheme had to be construed as a whole. Although revocation deemed the respondent never to have been an assisted person under regulation 74(2) of the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, the Fund remained liable for costs taxed or assessed under regulation 84(b). The continuing liability of the Fund was consistent with the Board having an indemnity-like right of recovery under regulation 86.
3. Regulation 86(1) applies to costs both paid and payable. Once the certificate had been revoked, the Board possessed the right to recover. The precise amount did not have to be established before the cause of action accrued. Taxation or assessment was a procedural step for quantifying the liability, rather than an inherent element of the cause of action.
4. The availability of declaratory relief before final quantification confirmed that conclusion. The court relied by analogy on Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 Q.B. 702, Sevcon Ltd v Lucas CAV Ltd [1986] 1 W.L.R. 462 and Swansea City Council v Glass [1992] 1 Q.B. 844. The general principle was also supported by Central Electricity Board v Halifax Corporation [1963] A.C. 785 and Hillingdon London Borough Council v A.R.C. Ltd [1999] Ch. 139.
5. The cause of action accrued on 12 May 1999, when the certificate was revoked. The claim issued on 14 March 2006 was out of time. The dismissal of the claim was affirmed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The appeal was dismissed in [2008] EWCA Civ 154.
2. Halifax County Court — Deputy Judge Taylor held that the claim was statute-barred because the cause of action accrued on revocation, and dismissed the claim.