Freeguard & Anor v Martlet Homes Ltd

Defamatory meaning is assessed by the natural and ordinary meaning of words read in their full context and against facts known to the recipients. Context may make apparently innocuous words defamatory, but may also remove an apparent defamatory implication. The court applies the perspective of an ordinary reasonable reader without an over-elaborate or excessively literal analysis. A reference to possible abusive conduct in a landlord’s response to a neighbour’s complaint does not ordinarily impute that the claimant is an abusive person. Where the words have no realistic prospect of bearing a defamatory meaning, the libel claim may be struck out under the Civil Procedure Rules and section 8 of the Defamation Act.

Mr Freeguard and his wife brought proceedings against their landlord, Martlet Homes Ltd, arising from a dispute with neighbours. A covering slip copied to the neighbours asked them to report if Mr Freeguard was abusive. The claim alleged that the words were defamatory in their ordinary meaning or by implication. His Honour Judge Mackie QC struck out the libel claim. Permission to appeal was limited to whether a jury could reasonably find the words defamatory. The central issue was the effect of the publication’s context and the facts known to its recipients.

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal.

1. Meaning and implication. The pleaded implication was not a legal innuendo based on special knowledge. It was an alleged implication in the words themselves and therefore formed part of the natural and ordinary meaning to be assessed by the ordinary reader.
2. Ordinary meaning. The court should consider the impression made on an ordinary reasonable reader reading the communication once. Such a reader is neither naïve nor unduly suspicious, and the court should avoid an over-elaborate, excessively literal or lawyerly analysis. Reasonable inferences may nevertheless form part of the meaning.
3. Context. Words must be read in context and by reference to facts known to the recipients. As explained by Keene LJ, context may make words defamatory, as illustrated by Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2KB 331 and Hough v London Express Newspapers [1940] 2KB 507, but may also operate in the opposite direction.
4. Application. The recipients knew that they had complained that Mr Freeguard had been less than civil. In that setting, the reference to being abusive concerned possible conduct in the continuing dispute and invited the landlord to intervene if it occurred. It did not accuse or suggest that Mr Freeguard was naturally abusive, or that such conduct was likely. No properly directed jury could sensibly find a defamatory meaning.
5. Disposition. The judge was entitled to strike out the libel claim because it had no prospect of succeeding at trial, exercising the relevant powers under the Civil Procedure Rules and section 8 of the Defamation Act. The appeal was dismissed and the application was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2008] EWCA Civ 1577: dismissed the appeal against the striking out of the libel claim.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: His Honour Judge Mackie QC struck out the libel claim as unsustainable.