T (A Child) v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council

Under the Children Act 1989, a supervision order made under section 31 initially lasts no longer than one year. The power in Schedule 3, Part II, paragraph 6(3) is a power to extend an existing order on the supervisor’s application; it does not permit the court to make a longer order at the outset. The three-year limit runs from the original order. Making a twelve-month order and immediately extending it is an impermissible circumvention of paragraph 6(1). An extension application should be issued in time for determination before expiry. If the order has expired, a fresh application must satisfy the section 31 threshold.

In public law proceedings concerning a child exposed to a continuing risk from a family member, Leeds County Court made a supervision order intended to last three years from the outset. His Honour Judge Hunt considered that the child’s welfare and practical considerations justified an extended initial order and granted permission to appeal on jurisdiction. The appeal concerned whether Schedule 3, Part II, paragraph 6 of the Children Act 1989 allowed an initial supervision order longer than twelve months, or required a first order of twelve months followed by an extension.

1. Appeal allowed. Thorpe LJ, with Arden LJ and Hughes LJ agreeing, held that the county court judge had no jurisdiction to make a supervision order for two or three years at the initial hearing.
2. Care and supervision orders share the threshold foundation in section 31 of the Children Act 1989. For duration, Schedule 3, Part II, paragraph 6(1) provides that an order made at first instance ceases after one year. Paragraph 6(3) permits the supervisor, by application, to obtain an extension or further extension, while paragraph 6(4) prevents the order from running beyond three years from the date it was made.
3. The statutory history supported that construction. Section 17 of the Children & Young Persons Act 1969 had expressly permitted a supervision order to run for three years or a shorter specified period. The later scheme deliberately replaced that direct power with a one-year initial order subject to judicially controlled extension. The court supported the approach in Re A (Supervision Order: Extension) [1995] 1FLR 335.
4. Making a twelve-month order and immediately extending it would be an impermissible circumvention of paragraph 6(1). Its artificiality was clear, and it would frustrate Parliament’s intention to reform the previous law.
5. Paragraph 6 contains no express earliest or latest date for an extension application. The court suggested that correspondence should first clarify whether extension is agreed and, if not, the issues in dispute. An application should be issued early enough for determination before expiry. In general, it need not be issued before the last quarter of the first year, subject to the facts and the relevant court’s capacity. If the order expires, the application becomes one for a new order and the section 31 threshold must be proved.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [2008] EWCA Civ 199, allowed the appeal and held that a supervision order could not exceed twelve months when first made.
• Leeds County Court: His Honour Judge Hunt, in a judgment dated 31 October 2007, made a supervision order intended to last three years and granted permission to appeal on the jurisdictional issue.