Kirklees Council v Davis

In sentencing for contempt of court, time spent in custody on remand before sentence should ordinarily count towards the sentence. Remand is an actual deprivation of liberty, and the sentencing court should expressly give credit for it. A flagrant, deliberate and serious breach of a protective injunction can justify imprisonment, particularly where the contemnor knowingly disobeys the order and repeats the prohibited conduct. An appeal may therefore be allowed solely to correct the failure to credit remand time while leaving the custodial term otherwise justified.

Kirklees Council obtained an injunction under sections 153 A and 153C of the Housing Act 1996 concerning alleged harassment and threats by Jonathan Davis towards two neighbours. The injunction was served, and Davis was arrested after alleged breaches. He spent about 16 days on remand, was later released on conditional bail following variation of the injunction, and was subsequently found to have committed further breaches. HHJ Bartfield imposed three months’ imprisonment for contempt. The findings of breach were not challenged. The appeal concerned the sentences, particularly whether the period spent on remand should have been credited. The central issue was whether the sentences were justified and whether the failure to give credit required appellate intervention.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent that the 16 days spent on remand were ordered to count towards the total sentence. The findings of contempt and the custodial sentences were otherwise upheld.

1. The injunction had been made under sections 153 A and 153C of the Housing Act 1996 and was subject to a power of arrest. The breaches immediately following service included threats, abuse, throwing objects and entering the exclusion zone. A later breach involved returning to the exclusion zone to sleep despite knowledge of the order and its consequences.
2. The breaches were properly characterised as deliberate, flagrant and serious. The fact that Davis denied the breaches and had lied about them was not, in itself, an aggravating feature. It did, however, demonstrate his unwillingness to face the court’s order and accept its constraints.
3. Given the background and nature of the breaches, the sentences imposed were amply justified. The apparent homelessness which preceded the later breach provided only limited mitigation.
4. Ordinarily, custody spent on remand before sentence should count against the sentence as a matter of justice. Remand custody is an actual deprivation of liberty. Although the judge referred to the 16-day period, he failed to order that it be taken into account.
5. The court warned that repetition of the conduct was likely to attract a sentence as serious as, or more serious than, those imposed.

1. Dewsbury court: HHJ Bartfield found the breaches proved and sentenced Davis to three months’ imprisonment for contempt of court.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division), [2008] EWCA Civ 632: allowed the appeal solely to direct that 16 days spent on remand count towards the sentence.