IA (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an internal-relocation claim, the question whether relocation would be unduly harsh arises only after it has been established that the proposed place is safe from persecution. A claimant cannot recast an asserted risk of persecution, including discriminatory restrictions on ordinary life, as an undue-hardship objection.

Country guidance may distinguish a place formerly associated with rebel activity from one associated with current rebel leadership. Later evidence about conditions in the place of relocation must show a material worsening beyond conditions already assessed in binding guidance before it can make an undue-hardship or Article 3 claim arguable.

The appellant, a non-Arab Darfuri from Labado, sought permission to appeal against an Asylum and Immigration Tribunal determination on reconsideration dated 9 October 2005, which had dismissed his appeal.

He relied on Labado’s former association with rebel activity, his father’s local leadership position, his brothers’ opposition to the Sudanese Government, and later evidence concerning forced relocations and severe conditions around Khartoum. The central issues were whether those matters established a risk of persecution and whether internal relocation to Khartoum would be unduly harsh or contrary to Article 3.

1. Application for permission to appeal refused. Moses LJ, with whom Longmore LJ agreed, held that none of the proposed grounds disclosed an arguable error of law with a reasonable prospect of success.

2. The Tribunal had been entitled to find that Labado was not a “hot spot” in the sense used in HGMO. Although it had formerly been a rebel stronghold, the relevant country guidance concerned a present association with current rebel leadership. The evidence did not compel a contrary conclusion.

3. Following Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5, the inquiry into whether internal relocation is unduly harsh arises only if the proposed place is otherwise safe from persecution. The appellant could not revive, at the undue-hardship stage, an allegation that discriminatory constraints on displaced Darfuris’ ability to work and live normally would themselves amount to persecution. Moses LJ treated that issue as disposed of by Januzi, the country guidance in HGMO, and the authority referred to as AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 297.

4. The country guidance did not establish that the appellant’s relationship to his father or brothers created a risk on return. The Tribunal had considered those matters, including the fact that he would be questioned and expected to answer truthfully, and its factual conclusion disclosed no arguable legal error.

5. The later report of forced relocations and deprivation around Khartoum did not describe conditions materially worse than those considered in HGMO and treated as not unduly harsh. Moses LJ questioned the Tribunal’s reliance on lack of verification to reject the evidence, but held that this did not assist the appellant because the evidence could not make either the undue-hardship or Article 3 ground arguable.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused the application for permission to appeal: [2008] EWCA Civ 741.

• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: on reconsideration, dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 9 October 2005 (AIT No: AS/05257/2005).