Keita v London Borough of Southwark

On a proposed second appeal, permission is available only where the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. New, fact-sensitive grounds that could have been argued below do not ordinarily satisfy that threshold. In a homelessness challenge under the Housing Act 1996, the county court’s role is confined to judicial review grounds. It must not remake primary findings or substitute its assessment for that of the housing authority. Where the authority considered the applicant’s mental state and good-faith case before finding that a refusal was deliberate, a challenge requiring renewed factual assessment raises no point of principle or practice.

Sulaiman Keita sought renewed permission to bring a second appeal against Judge Simpson’s dismissal, with costs, of his appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996. Southwark had decided under section 184 that he was intentionally homeless after refusing offered accommodation, and its reviewing officer had affirmed that decision under section 202. The proposed grounds challenged the treatment of his medical condition, alleged good faith, the adequacy of inquiries and several procedural matters. Sir John Chadwick had refused permission on the papers. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal met the second-appeal threshold.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. Lord Justice Rimer agreed with Sir John Chadwick that the proposed appeal did not cross the threshold in CPR Part 52.13.

1. Permission for a second appeal required either an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The further grounds concerned matters that could have been argued before Judge Simpson. Their fact-sensitive character meant that they raised no issue of principle or practice, and there was no compelling reason to entertain them. The fact that the appeal had also been issued out of time did not assist the applicant.
2. An appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 was confined to judicial review grounds. The decision was primarily for Southwark, and the county court was not entitled to make its own findings of primary fact. On a challenge based on failure to make further inquiries, intervention was justified only if no reasonable authority would have reached its conclusion without further inquiries.
3. Southwark’s section 184 decision and section 202 review decision had expressly considered the applicant’s mental state and the section 191(2) good-faith issue. The reviewing officer had found that he knew the relevant facts and had deliberately refused accommodation that was reasonable for him to occupy. Any proposed appeal on good faith or deliberateness would therefore require an impermissible reconsideration of primary facts and would raise no important point of principle or practice.
4. The complaint that the applicant had been absent from the county court hearing had no merit. He had been represented by counsel and his presence was unnecessary for a fair hearing because he was not required to give evidence. The discharge of the accommodation order made under section 204A was consequential on the county court’s decision. Order: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On the renewed application, Lord Justice Rimer refused permission to appeal: [2008] EWCA Civ 963.
2. Court of Appeal: Sir John Chadwick refused permission on the papers on 5 June 2008.
3. Mayor’s and City of London County Court: Judge Simpson dismissed the section 204 appeal with costs and regarded it as entirely without merit. An interim accommodation order made under section 204A was discharged.