Qureshi, R v

In assessing whether a sentence for preparatory terrorism offences is unduly lenient, the court must evaluate the offending across the broad statutory spectrum. Material considerations include the closeness of the nexus with contemplated terrorist activity, the nature of any intended assistance, the equipment held, and the absence or presence of weapons, explosives, identified plans and a concluded intention.

Where a guilty plea is entered on an agreed factual basis following a Goodyear indication, sentencing must remain within that basis. A substantial discount for a late guilty plea may remain proper where it avoids the expense, uncertainty and exceptional burden of a terrorism trial.

The offender pleaded guilty at the Central Criminal Court to preparing for terrorist acts, possessing articles for a terrorist purpose, and possessing records likely to be useful for terrorism. He had been arrested while intending to travel to Pakistan with cash, equipment and electronic material containing extremist, military and intelligence material.

Following a Goodyear indication, the pleas were entered on an agreed basis which did not identify a precise terrorist activity, location, or concluded intention. The Common Serjeant imposed a total sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment after a 25 per cent discount for the pleas.

The Attorney General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that it was unduly lenient. The central issue was whether the agreed facts and the late plea discount made the final sentence unduly lenient.

1. The Attorney General’s reference was dismissed. Leave to make the reference was granted, but the total sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment was left unchanged.

2. The court was confined to the agreed factual basis on which the guilty pleas had been entered after the Goodyear indication. It would have been wrong for either the sentencing judge or the Court of Appeal to use unresolved internet correspondence to go beyond those facts.

3. The court accepted that sentencing for terrorism offences must reflect their grave nature and the high statutory maxima. But offences under section 5 occupied a wide spectrum. On the agreed facts, the offender had intended to travel abroad to make himself available to assist terrorism, personally or with limited funds and equipment. There was, however, no weaponry or explosives, no identified plan or destination for terrorist support, and no concluded intention to commit or assist a particular act. The nexus between the proved acts and potential terrorist activity was relatively remote.

4. The court regarded the offending as comparable in seriousness to the relevant defendants in R v Khan and Others. The six-year pre-discount sentence was lenient, but it was not unduly lenient.

5. A 25 per cent reduction for pleas entered on the eve of trial was generous. Nevertheless, guilty pleas save the time, expense and uncertainty of trial, and terrorism trials impose a considerable burden on the administration of justice. The discount did not make the final sentence unduly lenient.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In an Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court granted leave but dismissed the reference and left the sentence unchanged: [2008] EWCA Crim 1054.
• Central Criminal Court: The offender pleaded guilty and received a total sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment.