Griffin, R. v

Where a jury returns a verdict of manslaughter without identifying its basis, the sentencing judge must sentence on the only possible interpretation of that verdict. If more than one interpretation is open, the judge must determine the proper basis from the evidence.

For dangerous-offender sentencing under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a previous specified offence requires an assumption of significant risk unless that conclusion would be unreasonable after considering all available information. Probation risk assessments may assist, but the statutory assessment and its consequences remain for the judge.

The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of manslaughter after the jury could not agree on a murder charge. Manslaughter had been left as an alternative on the bases of lack of intent or provocation. The jury returned no special verdict identifying its basis.

The sentencing judge treated the killing as provocation manslaughter, found the appellant dangerous, and imposed imprisonment for public protection with a notional determinate sentence of seven years. The appellant appealed against sentence. He challenged both the judge’s choice of sentencing basis and the dangerousness assessment, including reliance on a probation report using OASys and Thornton Risk Matrix 2000.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge was entitled to sentence on the basis of provocation. A sentencing judge must follow the sole possible interpretation of a jury’s verdict. Here, however, the jury’s verdict of manslaughter and failure to agree on murder admitted more than one explanation. The judge therefore had to decide the sentencing basis on his own assessment of the evidence. His conclusion that the appellant intended at least really serious bodily harm was open to him.

2. Manslaughter was a serious specified offence under section 224 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. If satisfied that there was a significant risk of serious harm through further specified offences, the judge was required by section 225 to impose imprisonment for public protection or life imprisonment. The prior specified offence engaged section 229. It required the judge to assume such a risk unless that would be unreasonable after considering all information about the offender.

3. The court held that the judge correctly applied that process. The earlier guidance in Lang and Johnson did not make dangerousness automatic, but required the statutory presumption and assessment to be addressed. The judge considered the current killing, the appellant’s escalating violence, the pre-sentence report, and the submissions challenging it.

4. Probation risk-assessment tools could properly inform the report. Their use had been approved in R v Boswell [2007] Crim EWCA 1587. There was no evidence that the Thornton Risk Matrix 2000 had been used inappropriately. In any event, the judge made the statutory assessment himself and was not bound by the probation officer’s conclusion. His finding of significant risk was unassailable, so there was no basis to interfere with the sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In R v Griffin [2008] EWCA Crim 119, the court dismissed the appeal against the sentence of imprisonment for public protection.

• Central Criminal Court: On 4 May 2007, the appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for public protection, with a notional determinate sentence of seven years.