Knight, R v

For an attempt to murder in which the offender took steps which would have caused death but for fortuitous circumstances beyond the offender’s control, the sentence should bear an appropriate degree of proportionality to the sentence that would have applied had murder been completed. A sentencing court may use the statutory murder minimum-term starting points in Criminal Justice Act 2003 as an analogy, but that analogy is not suitable in every attempted-murder case.

No further deduction is required merely because attempted murder is less grave than murder. The mandatory life sentence for murder, and the availability of remission for attempted murder, already reflect that difference.

The applicant was convicted unanimously at Stafford Crown Court of attempting to murder her husband by administering antifreeze. The victim suffered grave and lasting kidney, sight and hearing damage. The offence was committed before 5 April 2003.

The sentencing judge imposed 30 years’ imprisonment, treating the offence as an attempted murder for financial gain and using the 30-year murder starting point as an analogy. The applicant sought leave to appeal against sentence. The Registrar referred the application to the full court, which granted leave and considered whether the starting point and the treatment of mitigation were wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge was entitled to adopt a starting point of 30 years’ imprisonment. The appellant had attempted murder for financial gain and had taken steps which would have caused death but for fortuitous circumstances outside her control.

2. The court approved the approach in R v Simeon Szypusz and David Anthony Gaynor [2006] EWCA Crim 1552. Although the statutory murder minimum-term provisions did not directly govern attempted murder, sentences for attempted murder should bear a proper relationship to the terms served for murder. The 30-year starting point in paragraph 5(1)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 could therefore be used by analogy.

3. That analogy is not automatic. It may be unsuitable where later conduct by the offender materially reduces the victim’s suffering or saves life. The appellant instead persisted in her attempt and nearly succeeded, so no such qualification arose.

4. No deduction from the 30-year period was warranted merely because attempted murder is less grave than murder. Murder attracts mandatory life imprisonment, whereas remission is available for attempted murder; those differences already supply the relevant distinction.

5. Previous good character was mitigation. Estrangement from the appellant’s son was a consequence of the offence, not mitigation. Her lack of danger to the public did not mitigate the offence. Extensive premeditation, research, planning and the deliberate choice of a poison causing severe suffering were serious aggravating features. The mitigating and aggravating factors were balanced, and there was no reason to alter the sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Leave to appeal against sentence was granted, and the appeal was dismissed in [2008] EWCA Crim 1444.
• Crown Court at Stafford: The applicant was convicted of attempted murder on 29 January 2008 and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, less 30 days spent on remand.