Norman, R. v

Where child abduction is alleged on the basis that an accused induced a child to remain with him, the jury must be directed to decide whether the alleged words were proved, whether the child heard and understood them, and whether they effectively caused the child to remain.

A direction which omits that causal issue leaves the only viable prosecution case unexplained and renders the verdict unsafe. Where a finding that an unfit defendant did the act charged is quashed, Criminal Appeal Act 1968 requires an acquittal and ordinarily precludes a retrial.

The appellant, who had Huntington’s disease, was found unfit to plead. At a trial of the issue, a jury at Lewes Crown Court found that he had committed the act alleged: child abduction by detaining a child so as to keep him out of his mother’s lawful control. A hospital order and an unrestricted restriction order were subsequently made.

The appellant appealed against the jury’s finding and renewed his application for leave to appeal against the hospital and restriction orders. The central question was whether the judge had adequately directed the jury on the only available basis for proving that the appellant had induced the child to remain with him.

1. Appeal allowed. The jury’s finding that the appellant did the act charged was unsafe. It was quashed and a verdict of not guilty was substituted.
2. Under Child Abduction Act 1984, the Crown’s only viable case was that the appellant had detained the child by inducing him to remain. The alleged inducement consisted solely of words spoken during a telephone call with the child’s mother. The jury therefore needed a tailored direction that they had to be sure of the precise words, that the child heard and understood them, and that the words were an effective cause of his remaining. This followed the causation approach in R v A [2000] 1 Cr App R 418 and R v Leather (1994) 98 Cr App R 179.
3. The summing-up did not identify those essential issues. It referred generally to whether the appellant had detained the child by his actions, rather than whether the telephone words had induced the child to remain. There was no direct evidence that the child heard the conversation or that it affected him. Since this was the only issue before the jury, the verdict could not stand. The court did not criticise the judge, because the Crown had not put its case below in the way it advanced it on appeal.
4. The court did not determine the renewed submission that evidence from the appellant’s care adviser should have been admitted. That issue became academic once the verdict was quashed.
5. By section 16(4) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, no retrial could be ordered and an acquittal had to be recorded. There was no procedural irregularity permitting a venire de novo: see R v O’Donnell [1996] 1 Cr App R 286 and R v Hussein [2005] EWCA Crim 3556.

Postscript. The court added guidance on careful case management of fitness-to-plead proceedings and on the court’s personal duty under section 4A(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 to appoint a suitable person to put the defence case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Allowed the appeal against the jury’s finding in [2008] EWCA Crim 1810, quashed it, and substituted a verdict of not guilty.
• Lewes Crown Court After finding the appellant unfit to plead, tried the issue under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964. The jury found that he had committed the act alleged under the Child Abduction Act 1984. The Crown Court later made a hospital order under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983, with a restriction order under section 41.