Cameron, R v

Interference with a juror strikes at the foundation of jury trial. An immediate custodial sentence is ordinarily inevitable, even where the approach is indirect or naive, because deterrence is required.

The sentence must nevertheless reflect the precise nature and degree of the interference. Exceptional mitigation, including a prompt attempt to stop the contact, absence of a threat, minimal disruption, immediate admissions, an early guilty plea and serious personal consequences, may justify a substantially shorter custodial term. The assessment remains fact-specific and does not create a sentencing guideline.

The applicant pleaded guilty at Bradford Crown Court to doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice. She had arranged for a friend to send a juror a message asserting that a defendant, whom she knew, was not guilty.

The juror reported the contact. She was discharged, but the trial continued without significant disruption. The applicant promptly admitted her conduct and pleaded guilty at the first opportunity. The sentencing judge imposed 12 months’ detention in a young offender institution.

Her application for leave to appeal against sentence was referred to the full Court of Appeal. The issue was whether, notwithstanding the need for immediate custody for interference with jurors, the exceptional mitigation made the 12-month term manifestly excessive.

1. The court granted leave and allowed the appeal against sentence. It substituted four months’ detention in a young offender institution for the 12-month term.

2. Jurors must be able to perform their public duty free from external interference. Direct or indirect conduct intended, or tending, to persuade a juror away from proper performance of that duty undermines the jury-trial system. Deterrence therefore makes immediate custody inevitable for those who interfere with jurors, sometimes for substantial periods.

3. Sentence must nonetheless reflect the nature and degree of the particular interference. The 12-month sentence was within the general range indicated by the authorities, but the exceptional facts required a shorter term.

4. The applicant was young and of previous good character. Her conduct was naive. Once she appreciated its gravity, she unsuccessfully tried to prevent the message being sent. The message was indirect and non-threatening, the juror acted responsibly, and the trial was completed with little disruption. The applicant also made a full immediate confession, pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, and had already lost an exceptional work placement.

5. The court stressed that its conclusion was confined to those exceptional facts and was not a sentencing guideline.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): in [2008] EWCA Crim 2493, granted leave and allowed the appeal against sentence, reducing the term from 12 months to four months’ detention in a young offender institution.

• Crown Court at Bradford: on 27 August 2008, the applicant pleaded guilty to doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice. On 28 August 2008, she was sentenced to 12 months’ detention in a young offender institution.