Height & Anor, R v

Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, the starting-point categories in Schedule 21 are general principles, not inflexible or exhaustive rules. A sentencing judge must assess the overall seriousness of the murder and select a just starting point, even where the case does not match an example which would normally attract that category.

Accordingly, a person who procures and agrees to pay for a murder may fall within the 30-year, particularly high seriousness category despite acting primarily for a non-financial motive. Aggravating features used to select a starting point must not be counted again when adjusting the minimum term. Mitigation remains personal to each offender.

Anderson pleaded guilty to murdering his wife. Height was convicted by a jury of the same murder after the Crown relied on Anderson’s account of Height’s participation. Anderson had arranged and agreed to pay Height to procure the killing, while Height’s own motive was financial gain.

At the Crown Court at Nottingham, both defendants received mandatory life sentences. Anderson’s minimum term was 22 years and Height’s was 24 years. Height appealed his minimum term. Anderson sought leave, with an extension of time, to appeal his minimum term. The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had applied the starting points in Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 too rigidly, producing an unjust disparity.

1. Height’s appeal against sentence was allowed. His minimum term was reduced from 24 years to 22 years. Anderson’s application was refused. The mandatory life sentences remained in force.
2. Section 269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 requires a minimum term appropriate to the seriousness of the offence. Schedule 21 supplies general principles and starting points, but its stated examples are normal illustrations rather than exhaustive categories. A judge must decide, in light of the whole case, whether seriousness is exceptionally high, particularly high, or neither. An inflexible application would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and could cause injustice.
3. The 30-year starting point plainly applied to Height because he participated for financial gain. It should also have applied to Anderson. He was the prime mover who arranged and agreed to pay for the murder, and the many aggravating features made the murder particularly serious. The absence of an express Schedule 21 example covering that precise role did not require a 15-year starting point. It would be unjust for the paid participant to have a 30-year starting point while the person procuring the murder began at 15 years.
4. Having selected the 30-year starting point for both offenders, the court had to avoid double counting aggravating features already reflected in that selection. Anderson’s guilty plea and substantial assistance to the prosecution justified his 22-year minimum term. Height had no equivalent mitigation, but he was not the prime mover and his culpability was lower. Those distinct considerations fairly resulted in the same 22-year minimum term.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — in [2008] EWCA Crim 2500, Height’s appeal against his minimum term was allowed and his term was reduced to 22 years. Anderson’s application was refused.
• Crown Court at Nottingham — Anderson pleaded guilty to murder and Height was convicted of murder by a jury. Both received life sentences, with minimum terms of 22 years and 24 years respectively.