Mullen, R v

Where an adult murders a child and the murder involves sexual or sadistic motivation, the case falls plainly within paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In deciding whether a whole life order is appropriate, the sentencing court must assess all relevant circumstances together.

If a guilty plea and the offender’s relative youth or delayed maturity have already led the judge not to impose a whole life order, those matters need not produce a further discount from the subsequent minimum-term starting point. The judge may then increase the statutory starting point for distinct aggravating features, including the victim’s vulnerability, abuse of trust and suffering.

The applicant, aged 22 at the date of the appeal, pleaded guilty at Leeds Crown Court to rape and murder of his two-year-old niece. Simon J imposed life imprisonment for murder with a minimum term of 35 years, less 137 days spent on remand, and a concurrent or additional sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment for rape.

The murder followed rape and ligature strangulation. The sentencing judge treated the child’s vulnerability, the applicant’s position of trust as her uncle and her suffering as aggravating features. He did not impose a whole life order because of the early guilty plea, the applicant’s age and evidence of delayed emotional maturity.

The applicant challenged the 35-year minimum term as excessive, contending that insufficient credit had been given for his guilty plea, youth and immaturity.

1. Application refused. The 35-year minimum term for murder was not excessive.

2. The murder fell plainly within paragraph 4(2) of Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003: it was the murder of a child by an adult over 21 and involved sexual or sadistic motivation. It was not a borderline case for that category.

3. The sentencing judge was entitled to decide against a whole life order after considering the early guilty plea, the applicant’s relative youth and the evidence of delayed maturity. Those considerations were assessed together with all the circumstances. The applicant was nevertheless an adult who knew the fragility and defencelessness of his victim.

4. Having selected the 30-year statutory starting point after deciding not to make a whole life order, the judge was right to take account of separate aggravating features. These included the exceptional vulnerability of the child, the trust naturally reposed in her uncle and the suffering she endured.

5. The judge was not required to revisit the guilty plea or relative immaturity to give a second discount from the resulting minimum term. The benefit of those matters had already been reflected in the decision not to impose a whole life order.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): application to reduce the minimum term refused: [2008] EWCA Crim 592.

• Crown Court at Leeds: on 2 July 2007, following guilty pleas to rape and murder, Simon J imposed life imprisonment for murder with a 35-year minimum term, less time spent on remand, and 17 years’ imprisonment for rape.