Gedminintaite, R. v

A dog which bites an unprovoked pedestrian in a public place may properly be found to be dangerously out of control. The bite can demonstrate both that the dog was not under effective control and that it was dangerous, even if it was on a lead and had no previous history of aggression.

Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, section 10(3), is not an exhaustive definition. It identifies one circumstance in which a dog must be regarded as dangerously out of control, but does not prevent a court from applying the ordinary words of section 3 to the evidence.

The applicants were respectively the owner and a person in charge of two Rottweiler dogs. While the first applicant was walking the dogs in a public place, one dog bit a boy who was walking past without provocation, causing a serious but apparently non-lasting injury.

At trial, Judge Gibson ruled that the jury should be directed that the bite itself gave rise to grounds for reasonable apprehension of injury, so that the dog was dangerously out of control. The applicants then pleaded guilty and were sentenced. They sought leave to appeal against that ruling. The issue was whether the dog’s conduct established an offence under section 3 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.

Application for leave to appeal refused. The judge’s proposed direction was sustainable, and the applicants’ guilty pleas therefore stood.

1. The court held that the dog was dangerously out of control in a public place. It bit an innocent pedestrian who was simply walking past. That conduct showed both that it was not under effective control and that it was dangerous. The facts that the dog was on a lead and had not previously displayed a propensity to attack did not alter that conclusion.

2. The court considered the alternative approaches in Rafiq v Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] JP 161 and R v Bezzina [1994] 3 All ER 964. On either approach, the bite established that the dog was dangerously out of control for the purposes of the Act.

3. The court went further. Section 10(3) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 was not exclusive. Its wording did not confine the statutory concept to occasions of reasonable apprehension as defined there. The court was therefore entitled to apply the straightforward language of section 3 and find, from the dog’s behaviour and the absence of control by its handler, that the offence was made out.

The court did not decide how a genuinely provocative act towards a dog might affect a different case. No such issue arose on these facts.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): refused the applicants leave to appeal against Judge Gibson’s ruling on the proposed jury direction.
• Crown Court: Judge Gibson ruled on the direction to be given under section 3 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Following that ruling, the applicants pleaded guilty and were sentenced. The lower-court citation was not stated in the judgment.