Andrews, R v

A conviction following a guilty plea is ordinarily safe. An appeal against conviction is confined to whether the conviction is safe and is available only in extremely limited circumstances. A defendant cannot use the appeal to ventilate complaints about investigation, prosecution, representation, delay or evidence which could have been addressed before or at trial, particularly where the defendant chose to plead guilty. A dog may be dangerously out of control while on a lead; being on a lead is not a defence under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.

On 21 March 2019, at Oxford Crown Court, the applicant pleaded guilty to two offences under section 3(1) and (4) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 months’ imprisonment and made subject to financial orders, a contingent destruction order and a disqualification from keeping dogs.

The applicant sought an extension of 15 days in which to apply for leave to appeal against conviction, following refusal by the single judge. The renewed application required the court to consider whether the proposed grounds could arguably show that the guilty-plea convictions were unsafe.

The renewed application was dismissed. The court held that the applicant’s convictions were safe and that the contrary was not arguable.

1. The relevant question was whether the convictions were safe. An appeal was not an opportunity for a wide-ranging examination of complaints about the investigation, prosecution or treatment of the dog. A conviction following a guilty plea was ordinarily safe because the plea admitted guilt, and appeals after such pleas were available only in extremely limited circumstances.
2. The applicant had chosen to plead guilty after receiving legal advice. He could not rely on his decision not to instruct available counsel earlier, or on his decision not to maintain pleas of not guilty, as grounds demonstrating that the convictions were unsafe. The prosecution case was sufficiently clear, and the defence statement had been uploaded more than five months before trial.
3. The remaining complaints did not alter that conclusion. If delay had made a fair trial impossible, the proper course would have been an application to stay the prosecution as an abuse of process. An allegation of apparent judicial bias should have been addressed by an application for recusal. Contradictions in the evidence could have been explored at trial. The allegation that the applicant was of unsound mind was unsupported by medical evidence.
4. The court rejected the submission that a dog on a lead was, by definition, not out of control. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 provided no basis for that contention, and the decision in R v Gedminintaite [2008] EWCA Crim 814 contradicted it. Being on a lead would not have been a defence. That observation was unnecessary to the dismissal because the guilty pleas already rendered the convictions safe.

1. Oxford Crown Court: On 21 March 2019, the applicant pleaded guilty to two offences and was convicted and sentenced. No citation for the decision is stated.
2. Single judge: The applicant’s application was refused. No citation is stated.
3. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for an extension of time was dismissed in [2021] EWCA Crim 659.