Drummond v Pool Design Ltd

An irregular extension of time does not automatically deprive the court of jurisdiction. Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the court retains a broad discretion to extend or shorten time, including after the deadline has expired. The discretion should be exercised proportionately, fairly and pragmatically. Relevant considerations include whether the court was misled, the reason for the extension, and any demonstrated prejudice or realistic prospect that the extension would have been resisted successfully. A party seeking to set aside an extension must provide evidence supporting the alleged prejudice or grounds of opposition.

The claimant brought a substantial claim concerning defects in the design and construction of a residential swimming pool. The claim form was served within time, but the particulars of claim were served after the original deadline following an order extending time. That order was described as a consent order although one defendant, Mr Buckell, had not consented and had not received the application or order promptly.

Mr Buckell applied to set aside or discharge the order and sought consequential relief on the basis of alleged invalid service and lack of jurisdiction. The central issue was whether the procedural irregularity required the extension order or the claim to be set aside, or whether the court should exercise its case-management discretion to maintain the extension.

1. Mr Buckell’s application was dismissed. The court treated the issue as one of discretion rather than jurisdiction.

2. The original time limits were identified under CPR Part 7.5 and CPR Rule 7.4(1) and (2). However, CPR Part 3 and Rule 3.1(2)(a) empowered the court to extend or shorten time for compliance with a rule, practice direction or court order, even after the time for compliance had expired.

3. The court had not been misled. The application explained that Mr Buckell had not consented and that the other defendants had given the relevant consents. The court had therefore been entitled to grant an extension because mediation appeared capable of avoiding litigation and unnecessary cost.

4. The fact that Mr Buckell had lost the opportunity to oppose the extension did not justify setting it aside without evidence of good grounds which, at the relevant time, had a realistic prospect of defeating the application. His serious illness was acknowledged, but no evidence demonstrated material prejudice or a likely successful opposition.

5. The claimant’s failure promptly to serve the order and respond fully to correspondence justified a costs reduction. The claimant was awarded 25% of its costs of the application, assessed at £4,000, resulting in an order for payment of £1,000.