Director of Public Prosecutions v King

Whether a mechanically propelled vehicle is intended or adapted for use on roads is assessed objectively. The question is whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its uses might well be use on the roads. The inquiry concerns potential general use, not merely an isolated use or use by a person acting irrationally. Roadworthiness and safety are relevant but are not decisive. A vehicle may be a toy and still fall within the statutory definition. Its speed, design, capabilities and likely use may all be considered. A defendant’s intended use is relevant as one factor, but does not determine the issue.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated against the acquittal of Paul Matthew King by the South Somerset Magistrates’ Court. Mr King had ridden a City Mantis electric scooter while disqualified from driving and without insurance. The magistrates found that the scooter was not a motor vehicle within section 185 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

The central issue was whether the scooter was a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads, despite its low speed, limited equipment and resemblance to a toy.

1. Appeal allowed. The magistrates had misdirected themselves in law. The acquittal was quashed and the matter was remitted to the North Somerset Magistrates’ Court with a direction to convict on both offences.
2. The applicable test under section 185 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 was the objective test stated in DPP v Saddington [2001] RTR 15 and derived from Burns v Currell [1963] 2 All ER 297. The question was whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its uses might well be use on the roads. The issue was potential general use, not whether a reasonable person would personally use it on a road.
3. The qualification concerning isolated use or use by a person losing their senses was narrow. It did not permit the court to treat any use lacking regularity as isolated. The scooter’s design, capabilities, likely users and the practical pressure to use it on roads were relevant considerations.
4. Roadworthiness was not decisive. The absence of effective brakes, lights or other conventional equipment did not prevent a vehicle from being intended for use on roads. Nor did the scooter’s maximum speed of ten miles per hour. The Electrically Assisted Pedal Cycle Regulations 1983 did not apply because the scooter had no pedals, but their existence reinforced that a relatively slow vehicle might still be a motor vehicle.
5. The magistrates were not entitled, without evidence, to rely on their own personal experience to conclude that similar scooters were not used on roads. The defendant’s admission that the scooter would probably be used on a road or pavement was relevant, though not determinative.
6. A scooter could be a toy without falling outside section 185. The magistrates’ attempt to identify when an electric scooter ceased to be a toy introduced an impermissible additional issue. Applying the correct approach, the City Mantis was plainly capable of use by teenagers on smooth and even surfaces, and a reasonable person would say that it might well be used on the road.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by case stated was allowed. The acquittal by the magistrates was quashed and the case was remitted with a direction to convict.
• South Somerset Magistrates’ Court: The defendant was acquitted of driving whilst disqualified and using a motor vehicle without insurance.