Coates v Crown Prosecution Service

A person commits the first-limb offence under Highway Act 1835, section 72, by wilfully riding on a footpath; the prosecution need not prove that the thing ridden is a motor vehicle. A SEGWAY is also a carriage for the purposes of section 72. The statutory expressions “riding” and “driving” extend to riding or guiding wheeled machines, including bicycles and comparable devices. A SEGWAY is a motor vehicle under section 185(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 because its general use on roads is objectively contemplated. Manufacturer advice and intention are not determinative. The legality of SEGWAY use in other European jurisdictions does not affect the construction or application of English legislation.

The appellant was convicted by District Judge Rosenberg at Barnsley Magistrates’ Court after riding a SEGWAY on a pavement. The information alleged an offence under section 72 of the Highway Act 1835 and described the SEGWAY as a motor vehicle. The District Judge treated the determinative issue as whether the SEGWAY was a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads under section 185(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

On appeal by case stated, the appellant challenged the treatment of European law, the relevance of the manufacturer’s intention and the conclusion that the SEGWAY was intended or adapted for use on roads. He also sought to raise additional arguments concerning prosecution discretion, EU law and sentence. The central issues were the proper construction of section 72 and, if necessary, whether a SEGWAY was a motor vehicle and carriage.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed and the conviction affirmed. The three questions stated by the District Judge were answered No.

2. The information charged the first limb of section 72 of the Highway Act 1835, which prohibits wilfully riding on a footpath. The words describing the SEGWAY as a motor vehicle were surplusage. The prosecution therefore did not need to prove that the SEGWAY was a motor vehicle. The relevant question was whether the appellant was riding it on the pavement.

3. “Riding” is not confined to riding a horse. A person may ride a wheeled machine while being carried along on it, whether seated or standing, and whether propelled by an engine, by the rider’s feet or by gravity. The appellant was riding the SEGWAY. A person who guides and propels a wheeled machine may also be driving it.

4. A SEGWAY is a carriage within section 72. This followed by parity of reasoning from Taylor v Goodwin and also from section 85(1) of the Local Government Act 1888, which treats bicycles, tricycles, velocipedes and similar machines as carriages. The court left wider questions about the boundaries of “riding” and “carriage” for cases where they were determinative.

5. If necessary, a SEGWAY is a motor vehicle under section 185(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The objective test in Burns v Currell asks whether a reasonable person would regard road use as one of the vehicle’s general uses. Manufacturer intention, advice and expectations are not determinative. That test had been repeatedly followed and applied, and the SEGWAY plainly satisfied it. By section 191(a), it was consequently also a carriage for section 72.

6. The additional arguments were not open on an appeal by case stated because they had not been raised before the District Judge or included in the Case. The complaint about prosecution discretion would in any event fall far short of the exceptional circumstances required for judicial intervention. The EU-law argument was not determined, although the court regarded it as unpersuasive. Any challenge to the sentence lay to the Crown Court absent an error of law.

• High Court (Administrative Court): [2011] EWHC 2032 (Admin) dismissed the appeal by case stated and affirmed the conviction imposed by District Judge Rosenberg on 18 January 2011.
• Barnsley Magistrates’ Court: convicted the appellant under section 72 of the Highway Act 1835, fined him £75 and made orders for costs and a victim surcharge.