White, R (on the application of) v Crown Court At Blackfriars

Under section 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989, conviction of a relevant football-related offence will ordinarily be sufficient to justify a football banning order where the statutory court is satisfied that the order would help prevent violence or disorder. The legislation does not require proof of repetition or propensity. Deterrence may properly receive substantial weight, including where the incident was isolated. The position differs from applications based on previous conduct under section 14B. A judicial review claim should rarely be used to circumvent the time limit for an appeal by way of case stated, particularly where no serious injustice would result.

The claimant was convicted after assaulting a match official, entering the playing area and possessing a class C drug. The magistrates imposed a suspended custodial sentence, compensation and a three-year football banning order. The Crown Court varied the sentence and compensation but upheld the banning order, relying on the deterrent effect of section 14A.

The claimant sought judicial review, contending that the order was disproportionate because the incident was isolated and there was no evidence of propensity to football violence. He also relied on European free-movement principles concerning the passport-surrender requirement. The central issues were whether section 14A required proof of repetition or propensity, and whether judicial review should be entertained after the time limit for an appeal by way of case stated had expired.

1. Application refused. The court refused permission for judicial review and, having heard full argument, refused the application.
2. Section 14A(2) of the Football Spectators Act 1989 requires a banning order where the offender has been convicted of a relevant offence and the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the order would help prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with regulated football matches. If the court is not so satisfied, section 14A(3) requires it to state that fact and its reasons.
3. Following R v Hughes [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 107, section 14A does not require proof of repetition or propensity. In a normal case the conviction itself may satisfy the statutory condition, although particular circumstances may show that the court is not satisfied. The claimant’s assault on an official in front of spectators fell within that principle.
4. The Crown Court was entitled to give great weight to deterrence. The statutory wording and legislative policy permitted the conclusion that public knowledge that such conduct could result in a banning order would help prevent violence or disorder, even where the incident was isolated.
5. Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary [2002] QB 1213 concerned orders under section 14B based on previous conduct rather than a conviction triggering section 14A. Its proportionality reasoning therefore did not require a propensity assessment in this case. Any distinct challenge to the passport-surrender requirement under section 14E(3) could not justify quashing the whole order.
6. The challenge based on Directive 2004/38/EC was also procedurally defective: incompatibility had not been raised in the grounds, disapplication was not sought, and the Secretary of State had not been given notice. Judicial review should in any event be approached cautiously where it is being used instead of an out-of-time case-stated appeal. No serious injustice made that course appropriate here.

1. Magistrates’ Court: convicted the claimant and imposed sentence, compensation and a three-year football banning order.
2. Crown Court at Blackfriars: varied the sentence and compensation but upheld the banning order.
3. High Court (Administrative Court): refused permission for judicial review and refused the application.