Curtis, R v

Under section 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989, a football banning order may properly be made following a relevant football-related conviction even where the offender has no history of such disorder and the incident is isolated. Repetition or a propensity for football hooliganism is not a statutory requirement.

The assessment remains individual and fact-sensitive. The court may give weight to the seriousness and context of the disorder, deterrence, and the offender’s character and past conduct. A banning order is not automatic in every case. Its duration must also reflect the particular offender and offence.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Birmingham to threatening behaviour contrary to section 4 of the Public Order Act 1986, having originally been charged with violent disorder. The offence occurred during serious crowd disorder after a Birmingham City v Aston Villa match. He was fined and made subject to a five-year football banning order under section 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989.

He appealed against the banning order. He contended that the evidence did not justify a conclusion that it would help prevent future violence or disorder, and alternatively that five years was excessive. The central issue was whether an isolated participation in football-related disorder could justify a banning order and, if so, whether its duration was appropriate.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The court upheld the making of a football banning order but reduced its duration from five years to three years.
2. Section 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989 applies after conviction of a relevant offence. Reading subsections (2) and (3) together, the court endorsed the approach in R v Hughes [2006] 1 Cr App R(S) 632: in the normal case, the conviction may itself satisfy the court that an order would help prevent violence or disorder. The provision does not require proof of repeated offending or a propensity for football hooliganism.
3. The propensity approach in Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] QB 1213 concerned section 14B, which has a different statutory setting. The court also applied the reasoning in The Queen (on the application of White) v Crown Court at Blackfriars [2008] EWHC 510 (Admin). An isolated football-related offence can justify an order, and deterrence may properly carry great weight.
4. The decision is nevertheless individual and fact-sensitive. It does not follow that every football-related offence must result in an order. The court may consider the incident’s context, the offender’s precise conduct, past character, the deterrent purpose of the order, and the setting of a known flash-point. The sentencing judge had done so and had been entitled to conclude that an order was justified.
5. However, the five-year period was excessive. The appellant had pleaded guilty to the less serious section 4 offence rather than violent disorder or affray, and had no prior history of comparable disorder. A three-year order met the justice of the case.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Allowed the appeal only as to duration, varying the football banning order from five years to three years.
• Crown Court at Birmingham The appellant pleaded guilty to threatening behaviour and was fined £1,000. A five-year football banning order was imposed under section 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989.