Barron v Woodhead & Anor

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, a surviving spouse may receive reasonable financial provision whether or not it is required for maintenance. The question is objective: whether the disposition makes reasonable provision in all the circumstances, not whether the deceased acted unreasonably. The court must apply a two-stage process. It first decides whether reasonable provision was made, then determines the appropriate order by reference to the statutory factors. A spouse’s potential divorce award is an important cross-check, but equality of division is not presumed. On the facts, reasonable provision required secure accommodation and modest additional capital, rather than a substantial capital award.

Warwick Barron applied under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 for provision from the estate of his late wife, Gwyneth Ann Waite. The estate passed principally to her two children under her will. The parties had cohabited for about seven years and had been married for a further seven or eight years. Mr Barron was aged 73, faced homelessness following bankruptcy and the vesting of his former home in his trustee, and had uncertain financial resources. The central issues were whether the will made reasonable financial provision for him and, if not, what order should be made.

1. Objective assessment. The court held that a deceased spouse remains entitled to leave her estate to whomsoever she pleases, subject to the statutory obligation to make reasonable financial provision for the surviving spouse. For a spouse, reasonable financial provision is not limited to maintenance. The question is whether the provision was objectively reasonable in all the circumstances.
2. Two-stage process. The court must first consider the factors in section 3 to decide whether the disposition makes reasonable provision. If it does not, the same factors are then considered in determining the nature and amount of the order. The court has a wide discretion as to the form of relief.
3. Relevant considerations. The court considered the applicant’s age, needs, health, uncertain resources, likely homelessness, the size and uncertain value of the estate, the beneficiaries’ circumstances, the duration of the marriage, the parties’ responsibilities, conduct, and the provision which might have been expected on divorce. Conduct did not justify reducing the award. The divorce comparison was difficult to assess and did not require a substantial award beyond reasonable needs.
4. Order. The will did not make reasonable provision. The court directed that £100,000 be used to purchase a suitable property in which Mr Barron could live rent-free for life, with any balance invested to produce income for him. A further lump sum of £25,000 was awarded for moving costs and future expenses.

First-instance decision in the High Court (Chancery Division), sitting in the Newcastle-upon-Tyne County Court. The court made financial provision from the deceased’s estate for the claimant.