Craggy v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police

A police driver responding to an emergency call may be exempt from a statutory speed limit under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, but remains subject to the ordinary duty to take reasonable care in all the circumstances. The standard is contextual. A driver approaching a junction on green, with blue lights and a siren activated, is not ordinarily required to anticipate another vehicle entering against red where that possibility is remote and other road users could reasonably be expected to heed the warnings. Requiring the driver to proceed at a speed enabling him to stop for such an event may impose an unreasonably high standard. On the evidence, the police driver was not negligent.

A fire-engine driver was injured when his vehicle collided with a police car at a traffic-light-controlled junction. The police car was responding to a highest-priority call, travelling through a green signal with blue lights and a siren activated. The fire engine entered against a red signal while responding to an emergency, relying on Traffic Signs Regulation and General Directions 2002, regulation 36(1)(b).

The district judge found both drivers negligent, apportioned liability one-third to the police driver and two-thirds to the fire-engine driver, and awarded the claimant £833.33. The Chief Constable appealed on whether it was open to the judge on the evidence to find the police driver negligent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Owen J gave the principal judgment. Sedley LJ agreed, observing that the case was marginal. Lord Neuberger MR also agreed, despite the caution required before disturbing a careful inferential finding.

1. A police driver responding to an emergency may rely on the exemption from a speed limit under section 87 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. That exemption does not remove the ordinary duty owed by every driver to take reasonable care to avoid injury or damage. Regulation 36(1)(b) of the Traffic Signs Regulation and General Directions 2002 similarly permitted the fire-engine driver to treat the red signal as a give-way signal, subject to avoiding danger.
2. The assessment of negligence depends on the circumstances, including traffic conditions, visibility, the junction layout, warning signals and the reasonable foreseeability of another vehicle entering against a red light. Griffin v Mersey Regional Ambulance [1998] PIQR 34 (CA) rejected an absolute rule in favour of traffic crossing on green. It was materially distinguishable because the green-light driver in that case could and should have seen and heard the ambulance, and another vehicle had stopped to allow it to cross.
3. Here, the possibility of another emergency vehicle entering against red at the same moment was remote in the extreme. PC Price had activated his blue lights and siren, and could reasonably expect other road users to notice his approach. Requiring him to drive so that he could stop for that remote possibility imposed an unreasonably high standard. His acceleration to about 50 mph was not negligent in the circumstances.
4. The district judge therefore erred in finding culpable want of care by the police driver. The claimant’s admitted negligence in entering the junction at speed without an adequate view caused the collision. The appeal was allowed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2009] EWCA Civ 1128, the appeal was allowed.
• Middlesbrough County Court: District Judge Traynor found both drivers negligent, apportioned liability one-third to the police driver and two-thirds to the fire-engine driver, and entered judgment for the claimant for £833.33.