RT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an asylum appeal, the adequacy of an immigration tribunal’s reasoning must be assessed by reading the determination fairly and as a whole. A conclusion may stand where the tribunal considered all material evidence, including evidence raised on reconsideration, and its conclusion remains sustainable, even though parts of the reasoning could have been clearer. The treatment of family members is relevant to assessing how the authorities may treat the claimant. Indirect or hearsay evidence may be weighed when deciding whether later events undermine earlier findings about risk on return.

The appellant, from northern Sri Lanka, claimed asylum after alleging arrest, detention and ill-treatment by the Sri Lankan army following a roadside bomb explosion. The Secretary of State refused her application, and Immigration Judge Price dismissed her appeal, accepting her account but finding that she would not be of interest to the authorities on return.

The Administrative Court ordered reconsideration because the judge had not expressly addressed evidence that the army had visited the appellant’s family home after her departure. On reconsideration, the judge accepted that visits had occurred but found them to be routine searches rather than evidence of specific targeting. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether that reasoning was legally inadequate.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. The Court rejected the submission that the treatment of the appellant’s family was irrelevant. Evidence that family members had not been ill-treated was capable of informing the assessment of how the authorities were likely to treat the appellant herself.
2. The adequacy of the Immigration Judge’s reasoning had to be assessed by reading the determination as a whole. Although the reasoning on reconsideration could have been clearer, the judge stated that he had considered all the evidence in the round. He had considered the evidence of later visits together with his earlier findings and concluded that it did not displace his conclusion that the appellant would be of no interest to the authorities.
3. The judge was entitled to distinguish between routine searches in the appellant’s home village and visits specifically intended to target her. The absence of ill-treatment of family members and the absence of formal documents were relevant matters in that assessment.
4. The Court also regarded the essentially hearsay nature of the appellant’s evidence about the later visits as relevant. She was not directly involved in those events, and the tribunal was entitled to take that evidential limitation into account when deciding whether the evidence undermined its previous findings.
5. The reasoning was not ideal, but it was sufficiently clear and sustainable when read fairly as a whole. The order was therefore: Appeal dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2009] EWCA Civ 1155, the appeal from the reconsidered tribunal decision was dismissed.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: On reconsideration, Immigration Judge Price accepted that visits to the appellant’s family home had occurred but found that they were routine searches and that the appellant would not be at risk on return.
• Administrative Court: Holman J ordered the Tribunal to reconsider the decision on the limited issue of whether the army had sought the appellant on three occasions and, if so, whether that created a real risk on return.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: Immigration Judge Price had initially dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of asylum on 21 January 2009.