Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor

Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention can exclude a private individual responsible for terrorism. In this context, terrorism means the use for political ends of fear induced by violence. Domestic legislation must, where necessary, be read down to remain within the Qualification Directive.

“Serious reasons for considering” requires more than reasonable grounds or mere suspicion, but does not import the criminal standard of proof. A judicial body must give no weight to convictions probably secured through torture or to a bare indictment unsupported by disclosed evidence. Secondary evidence requires particular caution where primary material is available.

An Egyptian national appealed against the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s decision that article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention excluded him from refugee protection. The tribunal found serious reasons for considering that he had supported international terrorism, relying on Egyptian convictions, evidence concerning the assassination of General Masoud, police material and an unsupported United States indictment.

The Egyptian convictions had probably been obtained using evidence procured by torture. An English conspiracy-to-murder charge had been dismissed because the evidence was equally consistent with innocence, while a United States extradition request had failed for want of supporting evidence.

The central issues were whether individual terrorism could constitute acts contrary to United Nations purposes and principles, what evidential threshold article 1F(c) required, and whether the tribunal had lawfully evaluated the material before it.

1. Appeal allowed and remitted. Sedley LJ, with whom Arden and Longmore LJJ agreed subject to minor qualifications, held that the tribunal had erred in giving any weight to the Egyptian convictions and the unsupported United States indictment. The remaining evidence was capable of satisfying article 1F(c), but did not compel that conclusion. The appeal was remitted for redetermination by a differently constituted tribunal.
2. Individual terrorism can amount to conduct contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In this context, terrorism means the use for political ends of fear induced by violence. A private individual need not exercise state power. The purposes and principles of the United Nations nevertheless remain central, so reprehensible conduct with international ramifications does not automatically engage article 1F(c). The alleged use of a safe haven in one state to destabilise another state by violence supplied the necessary international dimension here.
3. Section 54 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, through its adoption of section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, must where necessary be read down so that article 1F(c) remains within article 12(2)(c) of the Qualification Directive.
4. The phrase “serious reasons for considering” creates a threshold above mere suspicion and, as Arden LJ added, above reasonable grounds. It does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt or proof making the tribunal sure of guilt. The word “guilty” means responsible and does not import the criminal standard.
5. Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights did not extend the criminal presumption of innocence to the discrete asylum proceedings. Even if it had applied, the presumption would have been rebuttable. In the simpler evidential sense, exclusion cannot arise until the Secretary of State produces evidence capable of amounting to serious reasons for considering that article 1F applies.
6. Following A v Home Secretary (No 2) [2005] UKHL 71, a judicial body must give no evidential weight to material probably obtained by torture. The tribunal’s finding that torture had probably produced the evidence underlying the Egyptian convictions therefore required their complete exclusion.
7. A bare indictment is an accusation, not evidence. The United States grand jury indictment had neither supporting material nor the evidential force of a conviction following a fair trial. It could contribute no weight to the article 1F(c) assessment. Potentially damaging secondary assertions also required careful testing against accessible primary material.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The court allowed the appeal in [2009] EWCA Civ 222, set aside the tribunal’s determination for errors of law and remitted the appeal for redetermination by a differently constituted panel.
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: The tribunal dismissed the asylum appeal. It held that individual terrorism fell within article 1F(c) and that there were serious reasons for considering the appellant responsible for supporting terrorists and terrorist organisations.
3. Secretary of State: The asylum claim was refused under article 1F of the Refugee Convention. Later grants of discretionary leave gave rise to the statutory right of appeal to the tribunal.