MH (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An appeal from an immigration determination lies only on a point of law arising from that determination, and permission should be refused where no material error of law is shown. Once continuity and identity of fingerprint evidence are established, an immigration judge may rely on it in assessing credibility. Deliberate lies about identity and travel, together with material inconsistencies, may support an adverse credibility finding. Disagreement with those factual findings does not establish an appealable error where the immigration judge made no mistake of law.

The appellant, an Afghan national, appealed after Immigration Judge Neyman dismissed his asylum, humanitarian protection and Convention rights appeals at a fresh hearing. The fresh hearing followed an earlier determination by Immigration Judge Lawrence, which had relied on Calais fingerprint evidence served shortly before the hearing; reconsideration was ordered because the appellant lacked a proper opportunity to consider it. On the renewed application, continuity of the Calais evidence was established and the appellant accepted that the fingerprints were his. The central issue was whether the remaining grounds concerning the fingerprint evidence, credibility assessment and standard of proof disclosed a material error of law.

1. Application refused. The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjourned application and refused permission to appeal. The continuity of the Calais fingerprint evidence had been established, and the appellant accepted that the fingerprints taken under another name were his.
2. Lord Justice Longmore held that there was no error of law in Immigration Judge Neyman’s decision. The applicant’s credibility was substantially damaged by his deliberate lies about his identity, nationality and date of birth, and his account was independently affected by inconsistencies concerning the kidnapping and his alleged cooperation with the police.
3. The Court’s role was confined to determining whether a point of law arising from the determination below disclosed a material error. It was not an opportunity to reweigh the evidence or substitute a different view of credibility. Once the fingerprint evidence and its continuity were accepted, the challenge to the factual findings disclosed no appealable error.
4. Lord Justice Moore-Bick agreed that there were no grounds for saying that the immigration judge had made a material error of law. Lord Justice Ward likewise agreed, holding that the immigration judge had correctly found that the appellant was the person stopped at Calais and had made no mistake warranting an appeal.
5. Order: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [2009] EWCA Civ 527, dismissed the adjourned application and refused permission to appeal.
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: Immigration Judge Neyman dismissed the asylum, humanitarian protection and Convention rights appeals after a fresh hearing. Earlier, Immigration Judge Lawrence had dismissed the appeal; reconsideration was ordered because the Calais fingerprint evidence had been served shortly before the hearing.
3. Permission stages: permission was refused by Senior Immigration Judge Southern and by Sir Henry Brooke on the papers. On oral renewal, the Court of Appeal adjourned the application so that continuity of the fingerprint evidence could be established.