MD (Guinea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an asylum appeal, an immigration judge may reject an account that appears plausible when the whole evidence, including cumulative inconsistencies and objective context, rationally points to fabrication. A statement that an account is plausible is not necessarily a positive credibility finding. Undated medical scars may have limited evidential value and may not require further findings about safety on return. Child evidence requires careful, age-sensitive evaluation, but extensive guidance does not create rigid legal rules, including a rule requiring a liberal benefit of the doubt.

The appellant, a Guinean national who was 17 at the AIT hearing, claimed asylum on the basis of forced marriage, domestic abuse, threats from her former boyfriend’s family and inability to obtain state protection. Immigration Judge Hussein initially dismissed her appeal. Reconsideration was ordered because he had not taken her minority into account when assessing credibility. On second-stage reconsideration, Immigration Judge Froom rejected the account and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal considered whether the credibility findings were inadequately reasoned or perverse, whether the scarring evidence required further assessment of risk on return, and whether the judge had lawfully assessed child evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. Laws LJ, with Longmore and Lloyd LJJ agreeing, held that the immigration judge’s reasoning disclosed no material error of law.
2. A finding that an account is plausible and relatively consistent is not necessarily a positive credibility finding. The judge remained entitled to reject the account after considering the whole evidence. The cumulative effect of inconsistencies, vagueness, implausibility and the surrounding circumstances rationally supported the adverse findings. Any complaint about that assessment was a challenge to fact-finding rather than law.
3. The absence of evidence as to the age of the appellant’s scars was a serious omission which greatly reduced their evidential utility. The immigration judge was entitled to associate the scars with earlier beatings by the appellant’s father and to infer that they were not attributable to the claimed forced marriage or domestic abuse. In those circumstances, no further analysis of safety on return was required.
4. Child evidence must be assessed with awareness of the child’s age and sensitivity to difficulties which may affect a child’s account. The judge should recognise the importance of objective background evidence and that inconsistencies fatal to an adult account may not necessarily be fatal to a child’s evidence.
5. The extensive guidance concerning children’s evidence must not be converted into rigid legal rules. There is no rule requiring a liberal application of the benefit of the doubt, or requiring objective evidence to override deficiencies in the child’s evidence. An individual assessment is required. The judge had demonstrated awareness of the appellant’s age, maturity, hearing arrangements and relevant background evidence; failure to repeat every guidance source did not establish an error of law. Permission to add the child-evidence and perversity grounds was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 17 June 2009, the court dismissed the appeal against the AIT decision. [2009] EWCA Civ 733
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal — Immigration Judge Froom dismissed the appeal on statutory reconsideration in a determination promulgated on 19 July 2007. The reconsideration followed Immigration Judge Hussein’s dismissal of the appeal on 24 January 2007 and Senior Immigration Judge Storey’s order for reconsideration on 22 February 2007.