Saunders v Chief Constable of Sussex

Partial summary judgment is inappropriate where separate negligence allegations are so closely interlocked that one cannot be fairly or satisfactorily extricated. This is especially so where the same medical and operational witnesses bear on both claims and disputed causation requires a trial. A grant of permission to appeal may be set aside under the Civil Procedure Rules only for a compelling reason; a material discrepancy in the permission materials must also have affected the permission decision and be outcome-determinative. A party must plead its case clearly, while retaining the ability to advance properly identified alternative cases.

The appellant, a police constable, alleged psychiatric injury after returning to work while suffering post-traumatic stress disorder following an earlier hand injury. He claimed that Sussex Police returned him prematurely and failed to plan or support the return, contributing to a subsequent breakdown and suicide attempt.

HHJ Simpkiss granted summary judgment on the premature-return aspect, treating it as vague and unsupported by evidence of clinical negligence, but did not dispose of the failure-to-plan claim. On appeal, the appellant relied on a corrected Part 18 response and a later clarification from Dr Angus. The respondent sought to set aside permission to appeal. The central questions were whether the claims were sufficiently interlocked to require a trial and whether the permission order should be disturbed.

1. Appeal allowed. The order granting summary judgment on part of the claim was set aside. The application to set aside permission to appeal was refused.
2. Lady Justice Arden held that the allegations concerning a premature return to work and failure to plan or support that return were closely interlocked. The occupational-health staff and officers at the workplace would be relevant witnesses to both aspects. There was therefore no meaningful case-management saving in disposing of one claim separately. The disputed circumstances of the return and the causation issues required a trial. Any deficiency in medical evidence concerning the occupational-health staff could be addressed through directions for witness statements and expert reports.
3. The respondent was entitled to know the case it had to meet. The appellant’s clarification of his case on appeal was accepted, subject to any minor amendment being agreed or raised at the case-management conference. Alternative cases were permissible, provided they were clearly stated.
4. In considering the application concerning permission, the court referred to CPR 52.9 and the compelling-reason test described in Hertsmere Borough Council v Harty & Ors [2001] EWCA Civ 1238. The court noted the need to show inaccurate or incomplete material, relevance to the grounds on which permission was granted, and that permission would otherwise not have been granted. Since the appeal was allowed, the application could not succeed and no further determination was necessary.
5. The matter was remitted for a case-management conference before another judge, with normal directions to be considered. Lord Justice Wall agreed entirely.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the appeal and refused the application to set aside permission to appeal. The summary judgment order was set aside and the case was directed to a case-management conference before another judge. [2009] EWCA Civ 87
2. Queen’s Bench Division, Brighton District Registry: HHJ Simpkiss granted the defendant summary judgment on the premature-return aspect of the negligence claim and made consequential pleading orders. The failure-to-plan claim remained outstanding.