Purdy, R (on the application of) v Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors

Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 creates a clear criminal prohibition on assisting suicide. Courts cannot create exceptions or suspend its operation; legislative change is for Parliament.

The consent requirement in section 2(4) provides central control over prosecutions and permits case-specific public-interest assessment. It is not confined to avoiding penalties. The Director of Public Prosecutions must issue general guidance, but need not publish an offence-specific policy. The absence of such a policy does not make the law insufficiently certain or incompatible with Article 8.

The Court of Appeal remained bound by the House of Lords decision in Pretty despite the Strasbourg court’s different approach to Article 8(1).

The appellant had progressive multiple sclerosis and wished, if necessary, to travel abroad to end her life with her husband’s assistance. She sought judicial review of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ refusal to publish an offence-specific policy explaining when assistance with suicide would be prosecuted.

The Divisional Court held that Article 8(1) was not engaged, and that the general Code for Crown Prosecutors, together with administrative-law safeguards, provided sufficient clarity and foreseeability. Permission to appeal was granted.

The appeal concerned whether the Court of Appeal was bound by the House of Lords decision in Pretty despite the subsequent Strasbourg judgment, and whether the absence of a specific policy made section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 contrary to Article 8(2).

1. Appeal dismissed. The statutory prohibition was clear. Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 did not admit judicially created exceptions. Parliament alone could decriminalise assisted suicide or identify exceptions.
2. The House of Lords decision in Pretty was binding. Under Kay v Lambeth LBC and Regina (RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the Court of Appeal could depart from such a precedent in only very exceptional circumstances of an extreme character. The difference between the House of Lords and Strasbourg decisions did not meet that standard.
3. The Court therefore held that the appellant’s Article 8(1) rights were not engaged. The Strasbourg court’s conclusion that Article 8 was engaged could not be followed in preference to the binding domestic authority.
4. Alternatively, the absence of an offence-specific policy did not make the statutory scheme unlawful under Article 8(2). The relevant inquiry required legality, a legitimate aim and necessity in a democratic society. Section 2(4) was an important part of the enforcement system. It secured central control, consistency, attention to mitigating factors and protection against inappropriate private prosecutions. The reasoning in Dunbar v Plant did not provide an exhaustive account of the provision’s purpose.
5. The Director’s statutory duty under section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 was to issue general guidance. He could issue offence-specific guidance, but was not obliged to do so. The general Code, the DPP’s published reasons in the Daniel James case and ordinary administrative-law safeguards gave sufficient protection against arbitrary decision-making. The DPP could not provide the case-specific assurance or effective immunity sought.
6. The Court added that it retained safeguards against abuse of process. A prosecution could be dismissed as abusive, and a court could order a discharge where no penal sanction was appropriate.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Dismissed the appeal and upheld the Divisional Court’s conclusion.
2. Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court Held that Article 8(1) was not engaged and that the general Code for Crown Prosecutors and administrative-law remedies satisfied the applicable standards of clarity and foreseeability. Permission to appeal was granted.