L, R v

In a prosecution for causing death by careless driving following successive road incidents, the defendant’s driving must do more than create the occasion for the later fatal accident. It must have made a non-negligible contribution to bringing about the death. Whether that causal connection is too remote is ordinarily a fact-sensitive question for the jury, assessed on all the evidence. A judge should withdraw the case only where a properly directed jury could not safely find the required causal connection.

The respondent lost control of his car in heavy rain, struck a traffic island and left his severely damaged vehicle partly protruding into the carriageway. Several minutes later, a taxi driver swerved to avoid it, struck the damaged traffic island and died when the taxi overturned.

The respondent was charged with causing death by careless driving. At Bradford Crown Court, HHJ Benson upheld a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case. The prosecution sought leave to appeal that ruling.

The central issue was whether the respondent’s careless driving could properly be regarded as causing the later death, or whether its connection with the fatal accident was too remote.

1. Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed. The trial judge had erred in withdrawing the case from the jury. The respondent’s driving did not need to be the sole cause of death. It had to make a contribution which was more than negligible and which amounted to bringing about the fatality rather than merely creating the occasion for it.

2. In cases involving successive incidents, the distinction between creating the circumstances of a fatal collision and causing it is fact-sensitive and one of degree. The question is ultimately whether the jury, considering all the evidence, can be sure that the defendant should fairly be regarded as having brought about the victim’s death by careless driving. A judge may withdraw the case where the connection is too remote, but should not do so merely because there are substantial points for the defence.

3. The factors relied on by the trial judge, including the limited intrusion of the crashed car into the road, the apparent visibility of the traffic island and the available space to pass safely, were proper jury points. They were not, however, so compelling that every properly directed jury would have had to acquit.

4. Under section 61(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a retrial was nevertheless unnecessary in the interests of justice. The prosecution case was not sufficiently strong and grave to justify a further trial after delay, when witnesses would have to recount a brief incident from less fresh memory.

5. Pursuant to section 61(4)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and consistently with the Crown’s undertaking, the court ordered the respondent’s acquittal.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Granted the prosecution leave to appeal, held that the no-case ruling was erroneous, but dismissed the appeal because a retrial was not required in the interests of justice. The respondent was acquitted under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
• Bradford Crown Court — HHJ Benson upheld the respondent’s submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case. Citation not stated in the judgment.