Barnes, R v

For causing death by dangerous driving, the dangerous driving must be a cause of death which is more than trivial. It need not be the sole or main cause, but it must do more than create the occasion for the fatal accident.

Where a vehicle carries an insecure load, dangerousness depends on whether it would have been obvious to a competent and careful driver that the load created a danger of injury or serious damage. The assessment includes circumstances the driver could be expected to know and matters actually known to that driver.

An unanswered request for a dictionary does not undermine a conviction without some indication that the jury had difficulty with a material word or issue.

The appellant was convicted at Peterborough Crown Court of causing death by dangerous driving after a sofa fell from his truck on a dual carriageway. A motorcyclist avoided the sofa, was distracted or turned to warn following traffic, and collided with the appellant's partly stationary vehicle. The motorcyclist died.

The appellant challenged the refusal of a submission of no case, the directions on causation and dangerousness, and several matters concerning the jury and summing-up. He also sought leave to appeal a sentence of two years' imprisonment, disqualification and an extended retest. The central question was whether the appellant's dangerous driving was a legally sufficient cause of death and whether the conviction was safe.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. There was evidence on which a jury could find that the appellant drove dangerously with an insecure load and that this driving was a cause of the death. The dangerous driving need not have been the only or principal cause. Applying the causation principle in Skelton [1995] Crim LR 635, it had to play more than a minimal part in bringing about the accident, rather than merely create its occasion.

   On the prosecution evidence, the sofa was visibly and audibly working loose while the truck travelled at speed. The jury could find that the appellant should have altered his driving or stopped earlier. The fallen sofa and the truck partly stopped on the carriageway were immediate hazards. It was open to the jury to find that these circumstances made a contribution to the collision exceeding the minimal threshold.

2. The trial judge's directions were adequate. He correctly directed that driving with the load was dangerous if it would have been obvious to a competent and careful driver that it created a danger of injury or serious damage. The directions properly required regard to both expected knowledge and matters actually known to the appellant. No further staged explanation of obviousness was necessary on these straightforward facts.

3. The jury's unanswered request for a dictionary did not render the conviction unsafe. The observations in R v Strong [1995] Crim LR 428 went no further than saying that it would have been preferable to answer the question there. There was no indication that this jury had difficulty with a material word. The other complaints, individually and cumulatively, disclosed no basis to disturb the verdict.

4. Leave to appeal sentence was refused. The judge was entitled to assess culpability as high on the Cooksley [2003] EWCA Crim 996 scale. Sentencing guidance remained guidance, and the trial judge was better placed to assess culpability from the evidence. The two-year sentence was not manifestly excessive, and the circumstances did not amount to special reasons against disqualification.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Conviction appeal dismissed and application for leave to appeal sentence refused: [2008] EWCA Crim 2726.

• Peterborough Crown Court — The appellant was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, disqualification from driving and an extended retest.