Williams, R. v

Under section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988, causing death while driving unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured does not require fault in the manner of driving. The offence is one of constructive liability. It is enough that the unlawful driving was a cause of death which was more than minute or negligible. It need not have been the sole, principal, main or substantial cause.

Causation directions must reflect the statutory context and the evidence. Although “substantial” or “significant” may sometimes assist, those terms may wrongly suggest that the defendant’s conduct had to be predominant. The jury must be clearly directed to the applicable threshold.

The appellant drove while unlicensed and uninsured. A pedestrian stepped into the road immediately in front of the vehicle and later died from injuries suffered in the collision. The Crown accepted that no fault, carelessness or lack of consideration could be attributed to the appellant’s driving.

At Swansea Crown Court, the Recorder ruled that the offence under section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 could be committed without driving fault. The jury convicted the appellant after being directed that his driving need only be a more than negligible contributing cause of death. He appealed against conviction on the construction of section 3ZB and against sentence.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The court held that section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 deliberately creates liability where death is caused by driving while unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured. It does not require the prosecution to prove fault, carelessness or other blameworthy conduct in the manner of driving.

2. The ordinary background principle that criminal liability generally requires morally blameworthy conduct could not justify adding such a requirement to the statutory language. The court applied the approach in R v Marsh [1997] 1 Cr.App.R. 67. To imply a driving-fault requirement would rewrite section 3ZB and would leave it with no apparent function alongside the offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving.

3. The court held that the appellant’s driving need only have been a cause of death which was more than de minimis. It did not have to be the sole, main, major or substantial cause. R v Hennigan (1971) 55 Crim.App.R. 262 established that standard for causation in driving offences, and Parliament was presumed to have legislated against it. The statutory purpose also supported that construction, even where the deceased’s conduct was the predominant cause of the collision.

4. The Recorder’s directions correctly stated that the driving had to be a contributing cause which was not minute or negligible. The court added that causation directions must be tailored to the particular offence and evidence. Terms such as “substantial” and “significant” may be misleading where the jury could understand them as requiring a principal cause.

5. The court had already allowed the appeal against sentence. It substituted a sentence of 24 weeks’ imprisonment for the nine-month sentence imposed below.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). By [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 , dismissed the appeal against conviction under section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988, but allowed the appeal against sentence and substituted 24 weeks’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Swansea. The Recorder convicted the appellant of causing death by driving without insurance and without a licence, imposed nine months’ imprisonment, and disqualified him from driving for two years.