MH, R. v

For the offence under section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988, the prosecution need not prove fault or other blameworthy conduct in the defendant’s manner of driving. The defendant’s driving need only be a cause of the death which is more than negligible or de minimis; it need not be the principal, substantial or major cause.

A victim’s sole responsibility for a collision does not itself entitle a judge to rule that the defendant’s driving was incapable of being such a cause. Where causation remains open on the evidence, the issue is for the jury. A terminating ruling based on the contrary proposition is wrong in law.

The Crown appealed against a terminating ruling made at the Crown Court sitting at Newcastle upon Tyne. MH was charged under section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 with causing a driver’s death while driving without a licence and without insurance.

On agreed facts, MH’s driving was faultless. The deceased, who had taken drugs and was severely fatigued, crossed into MH’s lane and caused the collision in which he died. The Recorder held that a jury could not reasonably find that MH had caused the death.

The central issue was whether section 3ZB can apply where the defendant’s driving is faultless and the death is wholly unrelated to the manner of that driving.

1. Appeal allowed. The Court granted leave, reversed the Recorder’s terminating ruling and ordered that the proceedings resume.

2. The Court was bound to follow Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552. That decision establishes that section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 creates liability without any requirement for fault or blameworthy conduct in the manner of driving. The statutory language does not permit a court to introduce such an additional requirement.

3. For section 3ZB, the defendant’s driving must be a cause of death which is more than negligible or de minimis. It need not be the main, substantial or major cause. The fact that the deceased was wholly responsible for the collision did not compel the conclusion that MH’s driving was only a minimal cause as a matter of law. A properly directed jury could decide the causation issue either way.

4. The Court could not distinguish Williams on the facts. Its reasoning was inconsistent with the Recorder’s conclusion that a jury had to find MH’s driving causally insignificant. The ruling was therefore wrong in law.

5. The Court observed that a free, informed and voluntary act will usually break the chain of causation, as explained in R v Kennedy [2007] UKHL 38. It also noted that Williams appeared to treat a victim’s extremely dangerous driving as not necessarily breaking that chain under section 3ZB. Those questions, and any separate “but for” issue, did not arise on the agreed facts.

6. Under sections 61 and 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Court could reverse a wrong ruling. A fair trial remained possible, so acquittal was not available and the proceedings had to be resumed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The Crown’s appeal was allowed. The Court reversed the terminating ruling and ordered the proceedings resumed: [2011] EWCA Crim 1508.
• Crown Court sitting at Newcastle upon Tyne: HHJ Hodson ruled, on agreed facts, that a jury could not reasonably find that MH had caused the deceased’s death.