R v Hughes

An unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured driver causes death by driving for the purposes of section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 only where an act or omission in the manner of driving is open to proper criticism and contributes more than minimally to the death. Mere involvement in a fatal collision, or factual “but for” causation, is insufficient.

The prosecution need not prove careless or inconsiderate driving. The relevant fault may fall below that threshold, but the defendant’s presence on the road cannot alone attract liability for homicide. Parliament must use unambiguous language if it intends to displace ordinary common-law causation in a penal provision of such gravity.

The appellant drove without insurance or a full driving licence. His driving was faultless when an oncoming driver, impaired by heroin and fatigue, crossed onto the wrong side of the road and caused a fatal collision. Nothing the appellant did could have avoided the accident.

The Recorder of Newcastle ruled that the appellant had not caused the death within section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988. On the Crown’s appeal, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, considered itself bound by R v Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 and held that involvement of the appellant’s vehicle in the collision was sufficient: [2011] EWCA Crim 1508.

The Supreme Court had to decide whether section 3ZB applies where the defendant’s driving was faultless and the deceased was wholly responsible for the fatal collision.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously and the Recorder’s ruling restored. Section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 imports a requirement of legal causation. The appellant’s faultless driving did not cause the deceased’s death merely because it placed his vehicle at the scene of the collision.

2. Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson, delivering the judgment of the court, held that ordinary common-law causation distinguishes a factual condition without which an event would not have occurred from a legally effective cause. Conduct which merely sets the scene or provides the occasion for an occurrence does not necessarily cause it. The common-sense inquiry asks whether the conduct was instrumental in bringing about the result.

3. Where several legally effective causes operate concurrently, the defendant’s conduct need not be the sole or principal cause. It must, however, be a significant or substantial cause in the sense of being more than minimal. The deceased’s dangerous driving was not a voluntary and deliberate act of self-killing of the kind which engaged the intervening-act reasoning in R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38.

4. Section 3ZB creates a serious homicide offence and may expose a defendant to imprisonment and lifelong stigma. Penal legislation must therefore be construed with a degree of strictness in favour of the accused. If Parliament intends to replace ordinary common-law causation with liability based simply on involvement in a fatal accident, it must do so unambiguously. The statutory words “causes the death … by driving” did not compel that exceptional construction.

5. The prosecution need not establish the separate offence of careless or inconsiderate driving. It must prove an act or omission in the control of the vehicle which was open to proper criticism and contributed more than minimally to the death. Fault might consist, for example, of causative speeding or a remediable vehicle defect even where the conduct would not independently amount to careless driving. Civil apportionment of responsibility is inappropriate to the criminal inquiry.

6. The contrary interpretation adopted in R v Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 and followed by the Court of Appeal in the present proceedings could not stand. On the agreed facts, nothing in the appellant’s driving contributed to the death. He therefore had not caused death by driving within section 3ZB.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Allowed the appellant’s appeal in [2013] UKSC 56 and restored the Recorder’s ruling that he had not caused the death within section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

2. Court of Appeal, Criminal Division: In [2011] EWCA Crim 1508, allowed the Crown’s appeal. It considered itself bound by R v Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 to hold that the appellant had caused the death in law.

3. Crown Court at Newcastle: The Recorder ruled that the appellant had not caused the deceased’s death for the purposes of section 3ZB.