C & Ors, R v

A sentencing court may take account of a death which an offender’s conduct factually set in train, even though the legal causal connection is insufficient to support a charge of manslaughter. In assessing whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, the court must consider the offence’s seriousness, each offender’s role and circumstances, previous character, guilty plea, welfare, and the need for deterrence.

Deliberate attacks on moving road traffic are exceptionally grave. They are easy to commit and may cause catastrophic consequences. Severe sentences may therefore be required to deter both the offenders and others who might engage in similar conduct.

Three children aged 16, 15 and 13 pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Merthyr Tydfil to a specimen count of criminal damage, being reckless whether life would be endangered, contrary to section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. They had participated in throwing stones and pieces of brick at vehicles on a busy road. Their conduct caused widespread damage and disruption. During the incident, a motorist stopped in the carriageway and a subsequent collision caused the death of another motorist and injury to a further driver.

On 27 April 2009, the judge imposed detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for four, three and two years respectively. The appellants challenged the sentencing judge’s reliance on the fatality, and contended that their sentences were excessive. The central issue was whether the judge had wrongly sentenced them as legally responsible for the death, or had imposed manifestly excessive sentences.

1. Appeals dismissed. The judge had not sentenced the appellants as if they had committed manslaughter. He expressly recognised that they could not directly be held legally responsible for the death.

2. The judge was nevertheless entitled to find that the appellants’ conduct had caused the unknown motorist to stop in the carriageway. The vehicle stopped at the place and time at which stones and bricks were being thrown into traffic. That conduct was inherently likely to cause fear, anxiety and possibly panic. The appellants had therefore set in train the sequence of events that ultimately caused the death, although the legal causal connection did not justify a manslaughter charge.

3. There was no basis for concluding that the judge had increased the sentences because members of the deceased’s family attended court. His remarks were a proper and considerate acknowledgement of their loss.

4. The sentences were not manifestly excessive. The court considered the grave and sustained danger created on a busy, fast-moving road, the respective roles and personal circumstances of the appellants, their antecedents, pre-sentence reports, guilty pleas and welfare. The judge had properly differentiated between them. Although the fatal outcome was not easily foreseeable in its particular form, the conduct could have caused death, serious injury and substantial damage in several ways.

5. Deterrence was especially important. Attacks on road traffic require little planning but can have catastrophic consequences. Courts should make clear that those who deliberately commit such offences will receive severe punishment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2009] EWCA Crim 1441, the court granted leave and dismissed all three appeals against sentence.
• Crown Court at Merthyr Tydfil: On 27 April 2009, Judge Curran imposed detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for four, three and two years respectively.