Fazal, R. v

For the purposes of section 327(1)(c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, criminal property is converted when it is lodged in, credited to, retained in, or withdrawn from a bank account. An account holder may commit the offence through another person. It is sufficient that the holder knowingly authorises and facilitates the use and operation of the account; the agent may be innocent or may have the necessary mens rea.

The statutory reference to conversion is not confined to the civil tort, although the breadth of civil conversion assists the construction. An indictment need not expressly allege joint enterprise where the defendant has had clear notice of the case and suffers no unfairness.

The appellant was convicted at Reading Crown Court, by a majority of 10 to 2, of seven counts of converting criminal property contrary to section 327(1)(c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The deposits made to his bank account were proceeds of fraud. He had allowed a friend to use the account, debit card and PIN.

His principal defence at trial was that he neither knew nor suspected the fraudulent use of the account. On appeal, he instead challenged whether his conduct could amount to conversion when deposits and withdrawals had been made by other persons. He also contended that the case was improperly advanced as joint enterprise without corresponding particulars in the indictment.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court upheld the conviction for converting criminal property under section 327(1)(c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.
2. The appellant’s authorisation of the use of his bank account, debit card and PIN was capable of constituting conversion. A person who operates an account may lodge, receive, retain and withdraw money through an agent. The agent’s innocence or criminal knowledge does not prevent the account holder from converting the money when the holder knowingly uses and operates the account in that way.
3. There could be successive conversions as the money was lodged, credited to the account, retained and withdrawn. Money passing through an account changes its legal character and the identity of the bank and creditor concerned. Each stage could therefore be a conversion where it occurred with the appellant’s co-operation, knowledge, approval and authority.
4. The statutory concept of conversion was not necessarily identical to the civil tort of conversion. However, its meaning was not far removed from the broad civil concept of taking, receiving, retaining or parting with another’s property in a manner inconsistent with the owner’s title.
5. The alternative joint-enterprise objection failed. It was not formally necessary to allege that the appellant acted with others unknown. In any event, an amendment could have cured such a defect if there had been no unfairness. The appellant knew the case he had to meet, and the jury had rejected his factual defence that he lacked knowledge or suspicion.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction in [2009] EWCA Crim 1697.
• Crown Court at Reading: on 14 August 2008, convicted the appellant by a majority of 10 to 2 of seven counts of converting criminal property. On 19 September 2008, imposed a 12-month community order with 180 hours’ unpaid work.