Ahmadza, R v

A conviction is not rendered unsafe merely because it appears surprising when compared with an acquittal on another count. An appellant alleging inconsistent verdicts must ordinarily establish a logical inconsistency and show that no legitimate chain of reasoning could explain the differing verdicts.

Each count requires separate consideration. A jury may properly reach different conclusions about a complainant's reliability on separate allegations, even where there is no corroboration and the allegations concern the same complainant. The Court of Appeal will not speculate about the jury's reasoning or interfere unless no reasonable jury could have returned the verdicts.

The appellant was convicted at Snaresbrook Crown Court of sexual activity with a male child. The count concerned alleged anal penetration of a 15-year-old boy, ST, at the back of an internet café and phone shop where the appellant worked. He was acquitted of a second sexual offence alleged by ST and of a separate allegation involving ST's younger brother.

On appeal, the appellant did not challenge the judge's directions. He contended that the conviction was unsafe because the acquittal on the second count concerning ST was logically inconsistent with the conviction on the first count. The central issue was whether the differing verdicts could stand.

1. Appeal dismissed. The conviction on count 1 was safe. The differing verdicts did not disclose a logical inconsistency and the Court could not say that no reasonable jury could have reached them.

2. The applicable approach was that stated in Bell and WM. In an inconsistent-verdict appeal, it is insufficient that the combination of verdicts is surprising. Ordinarily, the appellant must first establish a logical inconsistency and then show that no legitimate chain of reasoning could account for it. The Court will not interfere unless those conditions are met.

3. Each count had to be considered separately, as the judge had directed. The jury were not required to decide all allegations by the same complainant in the same way. As explained in G [1998] Crim.L.R 483, a complainant's credibility is not indivisible. A jury may accept evidence on one count but remain unpersuaded on another.

4. Durante was materially different. There the verdicts could not logically stand together because the same issue of intent, affected by intoxication, governed both offences involving the same cheque. Here the allegations concerned separate occasions and different circumstances. The complainant's evidence about the second incident had been vulnerable in cross-examination, so the jury could rationally have been less sure of that count while being sure of the first.

5. The Court did not need to reconstruct the jury's actual reasoning. The possibility of a legitimate explanation, coupled with the absence of logical inconsistency, was sufficient. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction in [2009] EWCA Crim 2031.
• Crown Court at Snaresbrook: convicted the appellant on 25 June 2008 of sexual activity with a male child and later imposed imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of three and a half years, less time on remand.